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Internationally, the development of juvenile justice (as it is called in most parts of the
world) can be traced to the child savers movement and the development of separate
institutions for the reformation of children in distress—‘delinquent’ children,
orphaned children, runaways and children on the street, and children who commit
offences (amongst others). These institutions were variously termed reformatories,
borstals and industrial schools. Echoing the international movement, the first
reformatory in South Africa, Porter Reformatory, was established by the then
Governor of the Cape Colony in 1870. It closed its doors as an institution for children
in conflict with the law in 1999.1
The culmination of this movement was the inauguration in Cook County, Illinois,
of the first separate juvenile court in 1899. This dedicated court was ‘welfarist’ in
nature and dealt with child protection and child delinquency at the same time. It was
based on the benevolent jurisdiction (parens patriae) of the presiding judge, whose
* BA LLB LLM LLD (Professor, University of the Western Cape and University of Leiden).
1 Skelton ‘Freedom in the making: juvenile justice in South Africa’ in Zimring, Langer & Tanenhaus (eds)
Juvenile Justice in Global Perspective (2015) 330.
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determination of the measure to be imposed was based on the needs of the child as
identified by the social services professionals acting in support of the court. The
court was held in camera, without the involvement of lawyers, and with an absence
of the formalities of trials. The development of separate juvenile justice systems
underpinned by legislation followed quickly in other civil and common law
jurisdictions. Following the introduction of legislation in England and Wales, the first
child protection laws in South Africa were enacted in the then Cape Colony in 1911
and 1913.2
In a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in In re Gault,3 it was
held that the mere status of being a boy does not permit a trial in a so called ‘kangaroo
court’. Gault had been sentenced, without any due process safeguards, to an
effective residential term of six years (an indeterminate sentence to ensue until he
turned 21 years of age) following an allegation that he had made an obscene
telephone call. The US Court required that certain due process guarantees be inserted
in juvenile court processes, including the right to notice of charges, the right to
confront witnesses and the right to appeal.4 To an extent, these due process
guarantees remain extremely relevant, as they are currently subsumed in art 40(2) of
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter ‘CRC’),
discussed in para 23.4 below. South Africa is bound to implement the provisions of
the Convention, having ratified it in 1995.
The retreat of welfarism as a theoretical model for approaching juvenile justice was
accompanied by the growing popularity of the ‘justice’ theory,5 premised on the idea
that the response should be proportionate to the offence, although this paved the
way for a wave of more punitive responses to juvenile offending, especially in the
United States.
The 1980s saw the introduction of the first experiments with diversion
programmes aimed at avoiding court proceedings and the concomitant stigmatisation
of juvenile offenders, as well as the acquisition of a criminal record at a tender age. By
the end of the 1980s, diversion existed in numerous different forms internationally,
such that it was included in art 40(3)(b) of the CRC.6
23.1.2 The antecedents of child justice in South Africa until 1990
The following sections describe some of the key drivers that shaped the design,
structure and focus of the current child justice system in South Africa. They were the
foundations from which the current system has emerged.
2 The Prisons and Reformatories Act 13 of 1911, which established the principle that children and young
adults should not be imprisoned; however, there were few alternatives in practice. See too the
Children’s Protection Act 25 of 1913, which provided that children could be detained in a place of
safety pending trial. See Skelton in Zimring, Langer & Tanenhaus (eds) Juvenile Justice in Global
Perspective at 331.
3 387 US 1 (1967).
4 Sloth-Nielsen The Role of International Law in Juvenile Justice Reform in South Africa (unpublished
LLD Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2001) 63.
5 Sloth-Nielsen The Role of International Law in Juvenile Justice Reform in South Africa 66.
6 State parties must take measures, wherever appropriate and desirable, for resorting to criminal
proceedings, provided that human rights and legal safeguards are respected.
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23.1.2.1 Institutions
The roots of child justice in South Africa can be traced to the establishment in 1879 of
Porter Reformatory, named after its benefactor, former Governor of the Cape Colony
Sir William Porter, and modelled on British reformatory schools. The legislative
underpinning of this was the Reformatory Institutions Act 7 of 1879. Espousing a
strict regime of discipline, the reformatory also provided apprenticed labour for
domestic and farm work.7 A subsequent reformatory was established at Heidelberg,
Transvaal in 1909.
Industrial schools were developed from 1894. By 1902, there were nine such
schools in the Cape Colony, and in the rest of the country they were established after
the South African war. These were not intended to be places of detention, but were
to provide practical industrial training (especially for the so-called ‘poor white’).
Although they were supposed to be facilities for children in the care system, in
practical terms they became a halfway house between the school and the
reformatory.8 The route to an industrial school was, however, through the welfare
and not the penal system.
23.1.2.2 Legislation
Disparate and uncoordinated legislation that was developed over the period 1879
until the 1930s set some precedents for a juvenile justice system.9 In 1934, the South
African government appointed a committee to consider whether it was desirable to
dispense with the criminal procedure as applied to juvenile delinquents, and instead
to deal with them in a welfarist manner, similar to care and protection proceedings.
The committee‘s report indicates that they ultimately decided not to take the
welfarist route. Instead, they drafted a Young Offenders Bill, which framed a
specialised criminal justice process for children. This Bill was not passed, so children
continued to be taken through the normal criminal justice process, albeit with a few
special features to accommodate their young age. These included in camera
proceedings, assistance from parents or guardians, and special measures of sanction
such as referral to a reform school.10
23.1.2.3 Whipping as a sanction and its abolition
After the introduction of apartheid in 1948, successive legislative measures adopted
harsher penalties for young people resisting the regime, especially after the
7 Chisolm Reformatories and Industrial Schools in South Africa: A Study in Class, Colour and Gender,
1882–1939 (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Witwatersrand, 1989). The educational programme
in the early years at Porter was minimal, and the majority of children had not previously attended
school.
8 Skelton ‘From cook county to Pretoria: a long walk to justice for children’ (2011) 6 Northwestern
Journal of Law and Social Policy 413.
9 Skelton (2011) 6 Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy 413 cites the First Offenders Act of
1906; the Prisons and Reformatories Act 13 of 1911; the Children‘s Protection Act 25 of 1913; the
Children‘s Protection Act 25 of 1917; the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917 (SA); and the
Children‘s Act 31 of 1937.
10 Skelton The Influence of the Theory and Practice of Restorative Justice in South Africa with Special
Reference to Child Justice (unpublished LLD thesis, University of Pretoria, 2005).
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Sharpeville uprising. Corporal punishment was the preferred punishment for young
people, and until its abolition in 1994 in the Constitutional Court case of S v
Williams,11 an estimated 35 000 to 40 000 juvenile offenders were sentenced to a
whipping annually. The judicial abolition of whipping served as a further impetus to
develop a separate juvenile justice system. In S v Williams, the Constitutional Court
in abolishing whipping sounded ‘a timely challenge to the state to ensure the
provision and execution of an effective juvenile justice system’.12
23 1.2.4 Racialised justice
It is widely recognised that the responses of the justice system to youthful offending
were tempered by race, with young black offenders far more likely to be visited with
the full might of the penal machinery, including being sentenced to detention in adult
prisons. Van der Spuy et al demonstrated that the cane became the major solution to
crimes committed by (black) children,13 and that white offenders were more likely to
be diverted into re-education and reintegration efforts than their black counter-
parts.14 Skelton records that studies of children committing crime became polarised
into evaluations of different race groups from a criminological point of view.15
23.1.2.5 Deprivation of liberty
The history of South Africa’s child justice system has been materially affected by the
history of deprivation of liberty of children, initially in prisons (together with adults),
and subsequently also in police custody. The spotlight was thrown on children
deprived of their liberty initially for participating in political unrest, and detained
without trial, by an eminent persons group despatched by the International
Committee of the Red Cross to review the conditions under which they were being
held. The report of this team was unexpectedly made public at the height of the state
of emergency that had been declared in the apartheid governments attempt to
suppress political dissent; it attracted global concern for the plight of children
deprived of their liberty.16
After the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990, political detentions of youth activists
ceased, but a grouping of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) continued to
advocate on behalf of children in detention for ordinary criminal offences, running
campaigns such as ‘Release a child for Christmas’ and ‘Letting in the Light’. The death
of a child in police custody in 1992 at the hands of an adult cell mate sparked a
further public outcry, and demands for a new child justice system intensified.17 The
focus on getting children out of adult prisons reached a peak when amendments
11 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC).
12 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) para [74].
13 See too Pete ‘Punishment and race: the emergence of racially defined punishment in colonial Natal’
(1986) 1 Natal University Law Review 99.
14 Van der Spuy, Scharf & Lever ‘The politics of youth crime and justice in South Africa’ in Sumner (ed) The
Blackwell Companion to Criminology (2004) 162–179.
15 Skelton in Zimring, Langer & Tanenhaus (eds) Juvenile Justice in Global Perspective 340.
16 Sloth-Nielsen The Role of International Law in Juvenile Justice Reform in South Africa 17 describes
this fully.
17 Skelton in Zimring, Langer & Tanenhaus Juvenile Justice in Global Perspective 343–345.
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were effected to Correctional Services legislation to prevent the pre-trial detention of
children in 1996. However, due to the inadequacy of existing alternatives to pre-trial
detention in prisons, the implementation of the legislation was highly problematic
and the status quo ante had to be restored while plans were developed to address the
issue of alternative facilities.18 These plans were largely formulated by an
Inter-Ministerial Committee on Young People at Risk (IMC) appointed in 1997. The
fruits of the IMC‘s work on deprivation of liberty of young people is discussed further
at para 23.2.4 below.
23.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE PILLARS OF THE EMERGING CHILD JUSTICE
SYSTEM AFTER 1990
23.2.1 Diversion
Diversion was first launched by the NGO NICRO (National Institute for Crime
Prevention and the Rehabilitation of Offenders) in 1992. By 1993, the organisation
was offering three different programmes for children in conflict with the law. Over
the next decade, diversion was extended to all provinces, and the range of
programmes expanded. Different service providers also entered the scene. The
initiatives of the IMC added ballast to the emerging child justice system, insofar as
several pilot projects concerned developing restorative justice diversionary projects,
and during the period of tenure of the IMC, considerable efforts were expended on
training judicial officers and prosecutors about diversion and its benefits. The way in
which diversion operated at this time was through the mechanism of prosecutorial
withdrawal of charges, pending the referral of the child to a diversion option and its
successful completion. The system was wholly dependent on the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in favour of withdrawal of charges. Nevertheless, throughout
the 1990s and until the introduction of the Child Justice Bill in Parliament in 2002,
diversion gained traction as a key feature of child justice in South Africa.19
By the time the Child Justice Bill was readied for introduction into Parliament,
three distinct phenomena could be remarked upon in relation to diversion services in
South Africa.
First, it was apparent that diversion services would by and large continue to be
delivered by NGOs, who were subsidised by the Department of Social Development
(DSD) in terms of service level agreements. That DSD, too, would carry the
responsibility for regulating diversion programmes and ensuring that the credibility
and integrity of diversion was maintained. The manner in which this has
subsequently been provided for in the body of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008
(hereinafter ‘CJA’) and regulations is described below.
18 Sloth-Nielsen The Role of International Law in Juvenile Justice Reform in South Africa 170–183
describes the saga of amendments to the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 to restrict children’s
detention in prisons.
19 Sloth-Nielsen ‘A short history of time: charting the contribution of social development service delivery
to enhance child justice 1996–2006’ (2007) 43 Social Work/Maatskaplike Werk 317.
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Second, diversion had already enjoyed legal recognition by the time the CJA was
passed. In S v D,20 four children had been arrested for possession of dagga, had been
taken to court, and after pleading guilty, received a criminal record within a short
period of time. The matter was taken on judicial review on the basis that, in a similar
matter a few weeks earlier, the accused children had been diverted. The review
court, after noting the increased use of diversion in the Western Cape Province,
nevertheless upheld the role of the prosecutor as dominus litis in deciding whether
or not to press criminal charges. In S v Z,21 the Court had laid down an important
guiding principle. As a starting point, before proceeding with a prosecution, the
court should enquire whether a child accused should be enrolled in a diversion
programme if this is appropriate in the circumstances. The willingness of courts to
embrace diversion set a positive tone for the extensive detail accorded diversion in
the CJA, and paved the way for Parliamentary endorsement of this.
Third, the exclusive dependence on prosecutorial good will to embrace diversion
in an unregulated environment, coupled with the need to ensure equal access to
diversion beyond urban areas, and to children from all race groups and
socio-economic classes, played an influential role in determining the shape and form
in which diversion would emerge in the CJA. Thus, some of the diversion orders, the
restorative justice options, and the division of diversion into two tiers, are the
products of these concerns. Further, as will be seen below, the mandatory nature of
the preliminary inquiry, to ensure that diversion would be considered in each and
every matter, draws inspiration from concern about unfettered prosecutorial
discretion leading to discriminatory access to diversion.
23.2.2 Assessment
The first assessment initiatives got underway in the Western Cape Province in 1994.
They were premised on an early social history evaluation of the child, the child’s
family circumstances, and the nature and circumstances of the alleged commission of
the offence by the child, with the aim of advising the prosecutor on whether
diversion was an option before a decision on pursuing a prosecution was taken. The
institution of assessment was substantially enhanced through the work of the IMC,
which tested different models in various centres.22 The Probation Services
Amendment Act 35 of 2002 concretised the concept by incorporating a definition of
assessment in the principal Act, and s 4(1) of the Act was amended to provide that
probation officers would bear the duty of performing assessments. During that
period, and until around 2006, efforts were expended on creating more probation
officer posts, and enhancing skills and capacity for the performance of assessment
services. A shift occurred after 2006, because it became known that South Africa was
experiencing a shortage of social workers to fulfil the tasks associated with the
implementation of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (as it would become), and that
20 1997 (2) SACR 671 (C).
21 1999 (1) SACR 427 (E).
22 See, for instance, Sloth-Nielsen The Durban Reception Assessment and Referral Centre: An
Evaluation Report (1999) (copy on file with the author). See, too, Sloth-Nielsen (2007) 43 Social
Work/Maatskaplike Werk 317.
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generic social worker posts were needed (rather than ones specific to probation
services).
This notwithstanding, the role of social workers/probation officers in the pre-trial
period23 continued to be seen as crucial to the integrated and multi-stakeholder child
justice system, and has resulted in the dedicated chapter on assessment which now
forms part of the CJA.
23.2.3 Reform of the child protection system
The history and ongoing trajectory of activism around children deprived of their
liberty, as described earlier, led to the establishment of the South African Law
Commission Project Committee on Juvenile Justice (Project Committee) shortly after
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter ‘the Constitution’)
came into operation. South Africa had ratified the CRC some months earlier (on 16
June 1995). The focus of the Project Committee was to be the formulation of
recommendations for a separate criminal procedural system for children in conflict
with the law. But the new international law context which the ratification of the CRC
heralded, coupled with the IMC investigation into the state of care institutions,
reformatories and industrial schools which had revealed shocking conditions and
abuse in these facilities,24 gave rise to the realisation that a broader investigation of
child protection law was required, beyond establishing a separate justice system for
children in conflict with the law. Hence a Project Committee on the Review of the
Child Care Act was additionally established, also under the auspices of the South
African Law Reform Commission (SALRC), but with significant representation from
the DSD.
The two Project Committees (on Juvenile Justice and on the Review of the Child
Care Act) worked in tandem to ensure that the products they developed were not in
conflict. There are thus some points at which the child care and protection system
intersects with the child justice system, and these are outlined in para 23.12.2 below.
23.2.4 The development of new institutions linked to the child justice
system
A key undertaking that emerged from the IMC process was the rationalisation and
reform of the various institutions linked to both the child protection system and the
child justice system. The IMC introduced the concept of ‘secure care’ in response to
the debacle that occurred in 1996 when children were released from prisons, and
available alternative facilities were unable to hold children charged with serious
offences safely and securely. The SALRC Report on the Review of the Child Care Act
proposed rebranding all children’s residential facilities ‘child and youth care centres’
(CYCCs). They would be differentiated by the programmes they offered (substance
abuse programmes, programmes for children with behavioural difficulties, secure
care, programmes for the reception of abandoned and orphaned children and so
forth). Ultimately, these would be governed by chap 14 of the Children’s Act 38 of
23 Previously their role was confined to compiling pre-sentence reports after conviction.
24 IMC, Government of the Republic of South Africa In Whose Best Interests? (1997).
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2005. Facilities which previously resorted under the Department of Education
(notably reformatory schools and some schools of industry) would be transferred to
the provincial DSDs,25 who would then be the custodian of all children’s residential
care facilities, whether operated by the DSD itself, or whether operated by NGOs or
faith-based organisations. Over the period 2001 until now, secure-care facilities have
been designated, built or commissioned in all provinces.26 The process of
transfer/repurposing of institutions formerly under the auspices of the Education
departments has now taken place. 27
23.2.5 The antecedents of the monitoring system for child justice
When the IMC was established and children were again by law permitted to be
detained in pre-trial detention pending the finalisation of their cases, an Inter-Sectoral
Committee on Child Justice was established in 2001 with a particular focus on
managing the flow of children into prisons. It comprised the Departments of Justice,
Correctional Services, Social Development and Education,28 the National Prosecuting
Authority, the South African Police Service and Legal Aid South Africa. Over time it
became evident that the sharing of data between the different role players was a
necessary and beneficial practice to ensure that blockages could be identified and
challenges addressed. The role of the current monitoring mechanism is evident
throughout this chapter, and is briefly discussed in para 23.12.1 below.
23.3 THE LAW REFORM PROCESS
The process of developing a proposal for a new juvenile justice system commenced
with the appointment of a Project Committee of the SLRC in 1996, as noted in
s 23.2.3 above. The Project Committee released an Issue Paper in 1997, a Discussion
Paper with a draft bill and motivated recommendations in 2000, and a Report on
Juvenile Justice with its final proposals and draft bill in 2000. The Child Justice Bill
was thereafter introduced to the Parliamentary process in 2002. As has been
recorded, after some deliberation on the Bill, the Parliamentary process went into
abeyance for a period of some years, and the Bill was only resuscitated in 2007.29
Public hearings were convened and the Bill was reshaped to a fair degree during the
deliberations. The final version was adopted in 2008, with the date for
implementation set at 1 April 2010, to enable planning for implementation to take
place.
The documents compiled by the SALRC remain important sources of reasoning
which can enhance understanding of various dimensions of the CJA. An example is
the SALRC approach to legal representation of children facing trials in a child justice
court, which were premised on the situation prevailing in the 1990s that most
25 Or repurposed for other ends—see para 23.12.2 below.
26 Some facilities are outsourced to private sector operators.
27 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Implementation of the Child Justice Act, 2008
(Act 75 of 2008): Annual Report: 1 April 2015–31 March 2016, available at http://www.justice-
.gov.za/vg/cj/cja-anr-2015–2016.pdf.
28 In view of their role as custodian of reformatories (at the time).
29 Skelton in Zimring, Langer & Tanenhaus Juvenile Justice in Global Perspective 345.
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children were unrepresented in court, and many refused state funded legal
representation when it was offered to them, preferring to conduct their own
defences. The scheme of the Act now in relation to legal representation is discussed
at para 23.11 below.
23.4 CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW CONTEXT
Sections 28 and 35 of the Constitution underpin the constitutional parameters of
child justice. The former section deals with children’s rights, and of note are s 28(2)
which renders the best interests of the child a paramount concern in all matters
affecting the child, s 28(3) which defines a child as any person aged below 18 years,
and s 28(1)(g) which enshrines as a constitutional right the child’s right not to be
detained except as a matter of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of
time, and further to be kept in conditions, and treated in a manner, that respects the
child’s status as a child whilst in detention.30
International law has influenced the development of the CJA in notable respects, as
has been described fully elsewhere.31 International law has also been significant in
influencing case law which has laid down benchmarks in South African jurispru-
dence. In particular, in Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development,32 the section of the Criminal Law Amendment Act
prescribing the imposition of a minimum sentencing regime on 16 and 17 year olds
for certain specified (serious) offences was struck down as unconstitutional.33
Cameron J pointed out that s 28(1)(g) of the Constitution drew inspiration from the
CRC, and further cited United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administra-
tion of Juvenile Justice34 (the Beijing Rules); United Nations Rules for the Protection
of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty35 (JDLs); and the United Nations Guidelines for
the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (the Riyadh Guidelines).36 He said that the
principles evident from these documents regarding child sentences are: proportion-
ality (children must be dealt with in a manner ‘appropriate to their well-being and
proportionate both to their circumstances and the offence’; imprisonment as a
measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time; that children
must be treated differently from adults; and that the well-being of the child is the
central consideration.37
30 Section 28(1)(b) may be relevant to children who are deprived of their liberty since they are then in
the care of the state authorities and deprived of a family environment.
31 See Sloth-Nielsen The Role of International Law in Juvenile Justice Reform in South Africa 475–493;
Skelton in Zimring, Langer & Tanenhaus Juvenile Justice in Global Perspective 346–351.
32 2009 (6) SA 632 (CC).
33 The Amendment Act was adopted to nullify the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v B 2006
(1) SACR 311 (SCA), which had held that the previous sentencing regime automatically conferred a
discretion on sentencing officers where an offender was under 18 years but over 16 years of age,
leaving them free without more to depart from the prescribed minimum sentence. The government
sought, with the impugned amendment, to undo the implications of this decision.
34 General Assembly Resolution A/RES/40/33, 1985.
35 General Assembly Resolution A/RES/45/113, 1990.
36 General Assembly Resolution A/RES/45/112, 1990.
37 Centre for Child Law v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 2009 (6) SA
632 (CC) para [61].
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International law, as well as the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the
Child (ACRWC),38 has most recently been cited in support of the Constitutional
Court’s approach to arrest and detention of a child via the prism of s 28(2) and
s 28(1)(g) of the Constitution in MR v Minister of Safety and Security.39 The rights
and obligations of children contained in international and regional instruments, with
particular reference to the CRC and the ACRWC are also reflected as guiding
principles in s 3(i) of the CJA.
As noted, the formulation of s 28 of the Constitution was inspired by the CRC. In
particular, the requirement that deprivation of liberty be used as a last resort and only
for the shortest appropriate period of time is based on art 37(b) of the CRC. This
article has been influential in the development of both jurisprudence in the sphere of
child justice, as well as in the organisation, structure and contents of the CJA which
limit detention. This topic is more fully discussed in paras 23.6 and 23.10 below.
The provision that the best interests of the child shall be of paramount concern in
all matters affecting children (s 28(2)) has also been adduced in the elaboration of
principles relating to child justice.
Restorative justice featured prominently in discussions which took place during
and prior to the Project Committee’s work. Inspired both by the then newly
introduce approach in New Zealand, as well as the restorative justice leaning of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the concepts and practice of restorative
justice feature significantly in the final version of the CJA.40 Restorative justice
features in the discussion on diversion (para 23.7 below) and sentencing (para 23.10
below).
23.5 APPLICATION OF THE ACT, AGE AND THE MINIMUM AGE OF
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
23.5.1 Application of the Act
The question of age is central in determining which persons would fall under the
jurisdiction of the CJA. During the law reform process, there was a fair degree of
consensus that the system should apply to all children under the age of 18 in
conformity with the age of childhood enshrined in the Constitution.41 There was also
a view that older youth could, exceptionally, benefit from the new procedures
envisaged in the Act, such as when children below 18 commit an offence together
with slightly older co-accused.
Hence, s 4(1)(b) provides for the Act to apply to a person alleged to have
committed an offence, who was 10 years or older but under the age of 18 years when
he or she was—
(a) handed a written notice in terms of s 18 or 22;
(b) served with a summons in terms of s 19; or(c) arrested in terms of s 20.
38 Ratified by South Africa in 2000.
39 2016 (2) SACR 540 (CC).
40 Skelton in Zimring, Langer & Tanenhaus Juvenile Justice in Global Perspective 351; Skelton (2011) 6
Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy 413.
41 Section 28(2).
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What of the situation that arose in S v Kwalase,42 where a youthful offender (15 years
at the time of commission of the offence) absconded and was brought to book only
when aged over the age of 21 years? A careful reading of s 4(1)(b) suggests that the
CJA would not apply, as the child justice system could then become contaminated
with the presence of much older adults in facilities and programmes designated for
those below the age of 18. However, s 4(2)(a) gives the Director of Public
Prosecutions (DPP), having jurisdiction, the discretion to direct that the matter be
dealt with in terms of s 5(2) to (4). There does not appear to be an age limit to the
exercise of this discretion, provided the arrest of the accused took place before the
age of 18 years. Hence, the DPP’s discretion could conceivably be exercised to cover
the sort of factual situation that arose in Kwalase.
Effect is given to the discretion to allow older youth to have the benefit of the
procedures under the CJA in s 4(2)(b), which provides that the DPP having
jurisdiction may, in accordance with directives issued by the National Director of
Public Prosecutions (NDPP) in terms of s 97(4)(a)(i)(aa), in the case of a person who
is 18 years or older but under the age of 21 years, at the time of arrest, receipt of a
written notice or service of a summons, direct that the matter be dealt with in
accordance with the processes of the CJA (including access to diversion and
mandatory appearance at a preliminary inquiry).
Processes commenced under the CJA (eg by an arrest or the receipt of a written
notice or summons) would continue to be concluded under the CJA despite the
young offender reaching the age of 18 years during the course of completion of its
processes.
The CJA is also applicable to children under the age of 10 years alleged to have
committed an offence as specified in s 4(1)(a). This is to ensure the applicability of
further procedures to such children (albeit not criminal procedures). The options for
children below the age of 10 are spelt out in s 5(1) and s 9 of the CJA. Where a police
official has reason to believe that a child suspected of having committed an offence is
under the age of 10 years, he or she may not arrest the child, and must, in the
prescribed manner, immediately hand the child over to his or her parents or an
appropriate adult or guardian. If no parent, appropriate adult or guardian is available,
or if it is not in the best interests of the child to be handed over to the parent,
appropriate adult or guardian, the child should be sent to a suitable child and youth
care centre (s 9(1)), and the police official must thereafter notify a probation officer. A
probation officer must then assess the child following the procedures and principles
outlined in chap 5 of the CJA, and then take one of the measures outlined in s 9(3),
namely referring the child to the children’s court on any of the grounds set out in
s 50; referring the child for counselling or therapy; referring the child to an
accredited programme designed specifically to suit the needs of children under the
age of 10 years; arranging support services for the child; arranging a meeting which
must be attended by the child, his or her parent or an appropriate adult or a guardian,
and which may be attended by any other person likely to provide information for the
42 2000 (2) SACR 135 (C).
Child Law October 2, 2017
Child Justice 687
JOBNAME: Private Law Pertaini PAGE: 12 SESS: 6 OUTPUT: Mon Oct 2 15:38:03 2017 SUM: 5E1B84E5
/first/juta−gj/juta/Priv−child−law−2017/23−ch23New
purposes of a meeting;43 or deciding to take no action. Regulations 3–15 of the Act
(promulgated by GN R251 in GG 33067 of 31 March 2010) prescribe how a child
under the age of 10 years must be handed over to a probation officer, and how the
various referrals that may be undertaken by the probation officer should occur in
practice. If the option selected is the arranging of a meeting relating to the
circumstances surrounding the allegation, the regulations prescribe the format and
content of the written plan that must emerge from that meeting. Assessments of such
children and their outcomes must also be recorded, and probation officers are clearly
directed by reg 11 as to what they need to consider before taking a decision that no
further action will ensue regarding a child aged below 10 who has been accused of an
offence.
23.5.2 Minimum age of criminal capacity
As regards the minimum age for criminal responsibility, this was much debated
during the law reform process, and the SALRC held a dedicated workshop to ventilate
the different options that might be feasible.44 Until the enactment of the CJA,
common law provided that the minimum age for criminal responsibility was 7 years
of age, with a rebuttable presumption of doli incapax operating for children above
this age, but below the age of 14 years (derived from Roman Law). The SALRC was
cognisant of the need to raise the minimum age for criminal responsibility from the
very low age of 7 years, and was also aware of moves in other jurisdictions to abolish
the presumption of criminal incapacity. The final version of the Bill proposed raising
the minimum age from 7 to 10 years, and retaining the doli incapax presumption as
a ‘protective mantle’45 to shield younger children from prosecution as far as possible.
The debates during the Parliamentary discussions on this issue some years later
were further influenced by CRC’s release in 2007 of General Comment no 10 on
Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice.46 The General Comment faced up squarely to
the indeterminate position in the CRC itself (article 40(3)(b) of the CRC provided
merely that a minimum age must be set, which should not be too low given children’s
age and maturity), by requiring that this age not be set at lower than 12 years, and
requiring that consideration should be given by state parties to the CRC to the
progressive raising of that age.
43 The purpose of the meeting convened by a probation officer in terms of sub-s (3)(a)(v) is to assist the
probation officer to establish more fully the circumstances surrounding the allegations against a child;
and to formulate a written plan appropriate to the child and relevant to the circumstances (s 9(4)(a)
and (b)). The written plan should specify the objectives to be achieved for the child and the period
within which they should be achieved; contain details of the services and assistance to be provided for
the child; specify the persons or organisations to provide the services and assistance; and state the
responsibilities of the child and of the parent, appropriate adult or guardian (s 9(5)). If the child fails to
comply with any obligation imposed on him or her, or with any responsibilities contained in the
written plan, the probation officer must refer the matter to the children’s court to be dealt with under
chap 9 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (s 9(6) and (7)).
44 Sloth-Nielsen The Role of International Law in Juvenile Justice Reform in South Africa 117–157. See,
too, Gallinetti, Kassan & Ehlers Child Justice in South Africa: Children’s Rights under Construction
(2006) Child Justice Alliance Conference Report chap 6.
45 SALRC (Project 106) Report on Juvenile Justice (2000) para 3.10–3.11.
46 Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment, CRC/C/GC/10 (2007).
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Parliament was, however, reluctant to move to the threshold level of 12 years in
the absence of data on the incidence and nature of offending children aged below 12
years. This led to the inclusion of s 8 of the CJA. This section called for the Minister
for Justice to submit a report to Parliament not later than five years after the
commencement of the CJA, to determine whether or not the minimum age for
criminal responsibility should be raised beyond 10 years. The information to be
provided was to be based on research on the number of children aged 10, 11, 12 and
13 alleged to have committed offences in the five year period following the
implementation of the Act; the nature of the offences they were accused of; the
sentences imposed on these children; the number of children of these ages whose
cases did not go to trial; and the number whose cases did not proceed because the
prosecutor was of the view that criminal capacity would not be proved.47
In February 2015, the Department of Justice and Correctional Services convened a
multi-stakeholder workshop to review the manner in which the scheme introduced
by the CJA was operating in practice. Attended by psychiatrists, Legal Aid South
Africa, magistrates, prosecutors, academics and researchers, the conference
resolutions were then tabled as part of a report to Cabinet in February 2016.48 The
Department of Justice and Correctional Services has submitted this report on the
Review of the Minimum Age of Criminal Capacity to Parliament for consideration;
whilst a formal presentation has taken place, the contents are still under deliberation
at the time of writing. The Report recommends that:
(a) The minimum age of criminal capacity be raised to 12 years with the retention of
the rebuttable presumption of incapacity for children 12 years or older but
under the age of 14 years, applicable (only) to children referred to the child
justice court for plea and trial;
(b) The Act (ss 7, 10, 11, 41, 49, 52, 58 and 67) be amended to remove the
requirement of establishing the criminal capacity of children 12 years or older
but under 14 years for purposes of diversion. The prosecutor and magistrate will
consider and be satisfied that the child’s educational and maturity levels are such
that he or she will understand and benefit from diversion before the child is
diverted;
(c) Section 8 of the Act be amended and retained in the Act to provide for another
review of the minimum age of criminal capacity within ten years.
Until such time as the proposals suggested are adopted by Parliament, the current
position under the CJA continues, as described next. Put simply, the current
minimum age for criminal responsibility is 10 years. Children below that age may not
be prosecuted, in accordance with s 7(1) of the CJA. Children between 10 and below
14 years can be prosecuted, but several safeguards have been built in to ensure that
(a) this does not occur for frivolous or petty cases and (b) that due consideration is
given to the actual establishment of the child’s criminal capacity before and during
the prosecution phases.
47 Section 96(4) and (5) of the CJA.
48 At the time of writing, this report is not yet publicly available. The author is in possession of a copy.
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First, s 10(1) requires that the prosecutor must have regard to a series of factors
before deciding to institute a prosecution against a child falling into this age category.
These are the educational level, cognitive ability, domestic and environmental
circumstances, age and maturity of the child, the nature and seriousness of the
alleged offence, the impact of the alleged offence on any victim, the interests of the
community, a probation officer’s assessment report in terms of chap 5 of the CJA, the
prospects of establishing criminal capacity in terms of s 11 if the matter were to be
referred to a preliminary inquiry in terms of chap 7, the appropriateness of diversion,
and any other relevant factor. Once the decision is made that criminal capacity is
likely to be proved, the matter can either be diverted, or referred for the convening of
a preliminary inquiry (discussed in para 23.8 below). If the prosecution is of the view
that the child’s criminal capacity will not be able to be proved, the matter will be
referred to a probation officer to be dealt with in the same way as where the child is
aged below 10 years and lacks criminal capacity ex lege.
Section 7(2) now incorporates a version of the common law rebuttable
presumption of criminal incapacity. It provides that a child who is 10 years or older
but under the age of 14 years, who commits an offence, is presumed to lack criminal
capacity, unless the state proves that he or she has criminal capacity in accordance
with s 11. Section 11, in turn, requires that the state prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the child had the capacity to appreciate the difference between right and wrong
at the time of the commission of the alleged offence, and the ability to act in
accordance with that appreciation.49
Every child who is alleged to have committed an offence must be assessed by a
probation officer. One of the purposes of the assessment, in the case of a child who is
between the ages of 10 and 14 years, is to express a view on whether expert
evidence on the criminal capacity of such a child is required. After completion of the
assessment, the probation officer must compile the assessment report including,
where applicable, a conclusion on the ‘possible criminal capacity’ of the child, if the
child is between the ages of 10 and 14 years, as well as measures to be taken in order
to prove criminal capacity.
An inquiry magistrate or a court may, on their own accord or at the request of the
prosecutor or the child’s legal representative, order an evaluation of the criminal
capacity of the child by a suitably qualified person, in practice a psychologist or
psychiatrist.50
Section 11 continues to provide that the state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the capacity of a child who is 10 years or older but under the age of 14 years to
appreciate the difference between right and wrong at the time of the commission of
an alleged offence, and to act in accordance with that appreciation. In making a
49 See in general Skelton ‘Proposals for the review of the minimum age of criminal responsibility’ (2013)
26 SACJ 257; Walker ‘The requirements for criminal capacity in section 11(1) of the new Child Justice
Act, 2008: a step in the wrong direction?’ (2011) 24 SACJ 33, referring to the absence of a requirement
that the child must additionally be proven to have appreciated the wrongfulness of his or her particular
unlawful conduct in the circumstances in which it was committed. Skelton proposes that the section
be more clearly worded.
50 Section 11(3) as amended by the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 14 of 2014.
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decision regarding the criminal capacity of the child in question, the inquiry
magistrate (for purposes of diversion), or if the matter has not been diverted, the
child justice court (for purposes of plea and trial), must consider the assessment
report of the probation officer referred to and all evidence placed before the inquiry
magistrate or child justice court prior to diversion or conviction, as the case may be,
which evidence may include a report of an evaluation referred to in sub-s 11(3).
This section to a great extent—but not completely—recasts the common law
rebuttal standard in statutory form.51
The provisions relating to criminal capacity were recently considered by a review
court in S v TS,52 a matter involving a 13-year-old girl who stabbed her stepfather with
fatal results. She was originally charged with murder, but the charge was later
reduced to one of culpable homicide. The accused pleaded guilty to the reduced
charge and tendered a plea statement in terms of s 112(2) of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977 (hereinafter ‘CPA’). She had armed herself with a knife to use as a
deterrent, due to an altercation with him earlier in the day. She did meet him later,
whereupon he threatened her, and she responded by stabbing him once with the
knife in the chest, which caused his death. At the commencement of the
proceedings, she had been assessed by a child psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist.
They found her to have borderline mental retardation, and the IQ of a 12-year-old.
The magistrate did not think this accorded with her own observations of the accused
in court, and pursued an ‘off the record’ discussion with the mental health experts to
clarify their findings. The experts were not called as witnesses. The accused was
convicted on the basis of her guilty plea.
On review, the court held that it was doubtful whether the s 112(2) statement
sufficiently satisfied the rebuttal of the presumption of incapacity beyond reasonable
doubt. Given the requirement of culpa for culpable homicide, the test to be adopted
appears to be that of the reasonable person, whilst the subjective frailties of the child
find their proper place in the assessment of the child’s criminal capacity.53 Another
relevant issue in the case were the requirements of private defence, which would
render the killing justified (not unlawful). In this assessment, the relative strength of
the accused and the victim, their relations, gender differences and so forth are
relevant considerations. In the result, the review court did not consider that the
accused’s admissions (in her plea of guilty) justified a conviction, in the light of the
experts’ concerns and the circumstances of the case. In particular, the court was
concerned ‘whether she had the capacity to determine the extent to which she was
entitled to use force . . . in the particular circumstance of the case and to act in
accordance with that appreciation’.54
51 Skelton (2013) 26 SACJ 257 at 260 and Walker (2011) 24 SACJ 33 at 35.
52 2015 (1) SACR 489 (WCC), discussed in Walker ‘Determining the criminal capacity of children aged 10
to 14 years: a comment in the light of S v TS 2015 (1) SACR 489 (WCC)’ (2015) 28 SACJ 33.
53 S v TS 2015 (1) SACR 489 (WCC) para [23]; see further paras [27] and [28]. See also S v Mshengu 2009
(2) SACR 316 (SCA) concerning the difficulty of admitting to one’s own criminal capacity in the face of
the rebuttable presumption of incapacity, in the context of a guilty plea (discussed in Skelton (2013) 26
SACJ 257 at 268).
54 S v TS 2015 (1) SACR 489 (WCC) para [37].
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S v TNS is indicative of some of the practical difficulties that the rebuttal of the
presumption of incapacity has occasioned. These include a shortage of resources to
conduct mental health assessments;55 the absence of a standardised assessment tool
for the mental health assessment of criminal capacity (which is a legal, not medical,
construct); magistrates’ uncertainty as to how they can be satisfied about a child’s
criminal capacity, without evidence to this effect, when diverting a child in terms of
s 49(1)(b) at the preliminary inquiry; difficulties that legally qualified people
(prosecutors and magistrates) raise concerning their competence to assess criminal
capacity prior to diversion due to their lack of expertise on child development; and
the fact that few children aged 10 or 11 years have been found to have criminal
capacity in practice. These and other factors are fully ventilated in the Department’s
Report on the Minimum Age of Criminal Capacity. Despite the mentioned difficulties,
the proposal to retain the rebuttable presumption for 12 and 13-year-olds appears
primarily motivated by the concern that removing such protection might be
constitutionally suspect in the light of s 28(2) of the Constitution.
It remains to be seen what Parliament ultimately decides.
23.6 POLICE POWERS, ARREST AND PRE-TRIAL RELEASE AND DETENTION
23.6.1 The constitutional provisions implicated in the deprivation of
liberty of children
MR v Minister of Safety and Security56 concerned an application for damages against
the minister for the unlawful arrest and detention of a 15-year-old child. Since the
matter commenced prior to the implementation of the CJA, she was arrested
pursuant to s 40(1)(j) of the CPA, which permits a warrantless arrest by a peace
officer of any person who ‘wilfully obstructs him in the execution of his duty’. MR
had intervened and interposed herself between her mother and police officers who
were trying to arrest her mother for violating a protection order, the incident taking
place at their house. The pair (MR and her mother) were arrested, taken to the
nearest police station and detained. They were released approximately 19 hours later.
The prosecutor declined to prosecute. Although at the Constitutional Court the
respondent conceded the unlawfulness of the arrest and detention of MR, the Court
nevertheless dealt with the constitutional and legal arguments at stake in assessing
her claim for damages for wrongful arrest and detention. Bosielo AJ, writing for the
majority, posed the following as the central questions to be answered in the context
of the facts:
Two crucial questions call out for an answer: first, what does the best interests of the
child mean? Intricately allied to this question is: what does it mean that these best
interests be accorded paramount importance? Second, what does this require of police
officers who have to confront children in conflict with the law in real life situations? In
other words, how does section 28(2) impact on the power of police officers to arrest
55 According to information provided at the expert workshop of February 2015, some provinces have no
state-funded posts for child psychiatrists at all.
56 2016 (2) SACR 540 (CC).
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under section 40 of the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA)? Does this mean that police officers
may never arrest and detain children, even when they are in conflict with the law?57
The evidence of both police officers was that even if they knew that she was a child
when they arrested her, they would still have arrested her. Concerning her detention,
their explanation is that notwithstanding that they knew that she was a child, they
had no authority to release her. Only the commanding officer or investigating officer
could release her.
The court first came to the conclusion that arrest and detention were two separate
legal processes, based on an analysis of the relevant provisions in the CPA (ss 40 and
41 versus s 50),58 and the ‘bright line’ distinguishing arrest and detention in s 35(1)
and (2) of the Constitution.59 The fact that both result in deprivation of liberty ‘do not
make them one legal process’.60 It was further noted that the police have a discretion
to effect an arrest for obstructing them in the course of their duties, which discretion
must be exercised in such a manner that they ‘weigh and consider the prevailing
circumstances and decide whether an arrest is necessary’, this being a ‘fact specific
enquiry’.61 The discretion must further be exercised ‘in the light of the Bill of Rights’,
‘cognisant of the importance which the Constitution attaches to the right to liberty
and one’s own dignity in our constitutional democracy’.62
Section 28(2) demands, in peremptory terms, that in all matters affecting a child,
her best interests are of paramount importance. In the context of an arrest of a child,
this requires of the police officers, notwithstanding the fact that they are satisfied that
the jurisdictional facts in section 40 of the CPA have been met, to go further and not
merely consider but accord the best interests of such a child paramount
importance.63
Since it was conceded that she was no threat to the arresting officers, had not
attempted to run away, and could easily have been handed a summons to appear in
Court or placed in her father’s care, had they considered her best interests, there
would have been no reason to arrest her.64
Hence, in the context of arrests of children, s 28(2) seeks to ‘insulate them from
the trauma of an arrest by demanding in peremptory terms that, even when a child
has to be arrested, his or her best interests must be accorded paramount
importance’,65 and arrest should be resorted to when the facts are such that there is
no other less invasive way of securing the attendance of such a child before a court.66
This does not, however, mean that children can ever be arrested—rather it requires
of the criminal justice system to be ‘child sensitive’. The consideration of the child’s
57 MR v Minister of Safety and Security para [5].
58 MR v Minister of Safety and Security paras [37] and [38].
59 MR v Minister of Safety and Security para [36].
60 MR v Minister of Safety and Security para [39].
61 MR v Minister of Safety and Security para [42].
62 MR v Minister of Safety and Security para [44].
63 MR v Minister of Safety and Security para [48].
64 MR v Minister of Safety and Security para [52].
65 MR v Minister of Safety and Security para [57].
66 MR v Minister of Safety and Security para [58].
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best interests is part and parcel of the exercise of the discretion to arrest, however,
and not an additional jurisdictional requirement, the Court held (at para 64).
Regarding the subsequent detention of MR, the Court affirmed that detention
‘constitutes a drastic curtailment of a person’s freedom which our Constitution
guards jealously, and should only be interfered with where there is a justifiable cause.
Second, detention has traumatic, brutalising, dehumanising and degrading effects on
people’. Further noting that detention facilities for children are not ideal places and
they can have harmful effects on the detained child (as they did in this scenario),67
which is the reason why, even when a child has to be detained, s 28(1)(g) of the
Constitution stipulates that it should be for ‘the shortest appropriate time’. It was
agreed that the need to detain a child is necessarily a fact-based inquiry that requires
a balancing of interests.68 In this instance, there was no evidence that police
considered her individual circumstances to determine if her detention was a measure
of last resort, and it followed that her detention was in flagrant violation of s 28(1)(g),
and therefore unlawful.69
Even though the decision in MR v Minister of Safety and Security is based on facts
which occurred prior to the implementation of the CJA, its ongoing relevance to the
interpretation of arrest and detention now conducted under the provisions of the CJA
cannot be ignored. These provisions, too, will have to be applied in practice against
the backdrop (through the lens) of the constitutional rights in s 28(2) and s 28(1)(g).
It is to an examination of the CJA provisions that the next section is therefore
devoted.
23.6.2 Securing the attendance of the child at the preliminary inquiry70
The first of these methods relates to the use of arrest, which is the usual entry point
for children in the criminal justice system. The Act restricts the use of arrest for
certain minor offences. Section 20 provides that compelling reasons must be present
justifying an arrest of a child for a Schedule 1 offence.71 The circumstances which do
justify an arrest for a Schedule 1 offence are specified in s 20(1)(a)–(e), and include
where the police official has reason to believe that the child does not have a fixed
address, that the child will continue to commit offences unless he or she is arrested,
that the child poses a danger to any person, and that the offence is in the process of
being committed. The SAPS National Instruction adds three further circumstances
justifying an arrest, namely where the child has absconded from foster care, from a
67 MR v Minister of Safety and Security para [68].
68 MR v Minister of Safety and Security para [69], citing dicta from Centre for Child Law v Minister of
Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (6) SA 632 (CC) para [29].
69 See the discussion of this case in Paizes & Van der Merwe ‘[Section] 40(1)(j): arrest of a child and the
impact of the constitutionally protected best interests of the child’ 2016 (No 2) Criminal Justice
Review, available at https://juta.co.za/newsletter/newsletter/criminal-justice-review-2-of-2016/.
70 See Sloth-Nielsen ‘Deprivation of children’s liberty as a last resort and for the shortest period of time:
how far have we come? And can we do better?’ (2013) 26 SACJ 316. Note that the provisions of the CJA
must be read in tandem with National Instruction (2 of 2010) (published under GN 759 GG 33508 of 2
September 2010) which deals with children in conflict with the law and the duties and role of the
police.
71 The CJA is premised on three schedules of offences, with Schedule 1 containing the least serious group
and Schedule 3 the most serious. Many provisions in the CJA are ordered around the schedules.
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child and youth care centre, or from temporary safe care; where the child is likely to
destroy or tamper with evidential material relating to the offence; and where the
child is deemed likely to interfere with the investigation into the offences unless
arrested.72
The duty is placed on the police official effecting an arrest to inform the child of his
or her rights and of the nature of the allegation against him or her, to explain to the
child the immediate procedures to be followed under the CJA, and to notify the
child’s parents, an appropriate adult73 or guardian, of the arrest. Where a police
official has been unable to notify the adult caregivers referred to here, a written
report must be submitted to the official presiding at the preliminary inquiry.74 A
further obligation is placed on the police, preferably the arresting official, to notify a
probation officer of a child’s arrest within 24 hours; again, if unable to do so, a written
report must be submitted to the inquiry magistrate at the preliminary inquiry with
reasons for non-compliance.75 An arrested child must be brought to court within 48
hours, whether or not assessment has been effected.76
The use of a summons77 or a written notice to appear in court are provided as
alternatives to securing attendance by means of an arrest.78
Available data indicates a gradual but steady decrease in the numbers of children
entering the system since the implementation of the CJA. Information on the total
number of arrests is not kept—instead police collect information on the number of
charges (and the number of children could well be far lower given that children may
face multiple charges).
The total number of charges fell from 80 106 in the 2010/2011 reporting year, to
47 644 in the 2015/2016 reporting year.79 The reasons for this very marked decline
can only but be speculated upon as no definitive study has seen the light of day as yet.
However, it has been posited that the onerous written reporting requirements placed
on the police have served as a deterrent to arresting children (see, too, in this regard
para 23.6.3 below).80
23.6.3 Pre-trial release from police custody
In accordance with the constitutional imperative to ensure that deprivation of liberty
is for the shortest appropriate period of time, the scheme of the CJA is to ensure the
child’s early release from police custody.
72 National Instruction 2 of 2010: Children in Conflict with the Law, GN 759 in GG 33508 at paras 8(3)(ii),
(v) and (vi).
73 Defined as any member of the child’s family including a sibling who is aged over 16 years, or a caregiver
referred to in s 1 of the CJA.
74 Section 20(3)(a)–(d) of the CJA.




79 SAPS Annual Report on the Implementation of the Child Justice Act 1 April 2015–31 March 2016 at
5, available at http://www.justice.gov.za/vg/cj/cja-anr-2015–2016.pdf.
80 Badenhorst The Second Year of Implementation of the Child Justice Act: Dwindling Numbers (2012)
Child Justice Alliance Report 8. See also Sloth-Nielsen (2013) 26 SACJ 316.
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Even where an arrest has been effected for a Schedule 1 offence, the police official
must release the child into the care of a parent, guardian or appropriate adult before
the child’s appearance at a preliminary inquiry and as soon as possible.81 The only
exceptions to this that the Act contemplates are where the relevant adults cannot be
located, despite all reasonable efforts, or are not available;82 or that there is a risk that
the child may be a danger to any other person or to himself.83 Where a police official
does not release a child charged with a Schedule 1 offence from police custody, a
written report with reasons for not doing so must be furnished to the inquiry
magistrate.84 The child who is released from police custody must be given a written
notice to appear at the preliminary inquiry.85
Furthermore, the police official must consider the possibility of detention in a
facility other than police custody, such as a suitable child and youth care centre: this
is regarded as being less restrictive and a more appropriate form of detention than
being held in custody in police cells.86
Where an arrested child is charged with a Schedule 1 offence and has not been
released, or has been charged with a Schedule 2 offence, the child may be released
before first appearance at a preliminary inquiry by a prosecutor, who may release the
child on bail.87
A child charged with a Schedule 3 offence may not be released by the police or
prosecutor, but must appear at a preliminary inquiry.
23.6.4 Further provisions relating to release or placement in the pre-trial
phase
The CJA clearly contemplates that release is the preferred option, and this is evident
from the placement of s 24 in the first part of chap 4. It provides that upon
appearance at a preliminary inquiry or child justice court, the presiding officer must
consider the release of a child who remains (at that point) in custody, into the care of
a parent, guardian or an appropriate adult or, if the child is charged with a Schedule 1
or 2 offence, on own recognisances if it is in the interests of justice to release the
child. In determining whether it is in the interests of justice, the recommendations in
the assessment report and all other relevant factors (listed as the child’s best interests,
the existence of previous convictions, the fact that the child is between 10 and 14
years and subject to the presumption of criminal incapacity, the interests and safety
of the community in which the child resides and the seriousness of the offence) must
be taken into account.88 Conditions such as school attendance or home-based
supervision may be attached to the release of the child.89
81 Section 22(1) of the CJA.
82 Section 22(1)(a).
83 Section 22(1)(b).
84 Section 22(2) and SAPS Form 583(c).
85 Section 23.




Child Law October 2, 2017
696 Justice for Children as Victims and as Offenders
JOBNAME: Private Law Pertaini PAGE: 21 SESS: 6 OUTPUT: Mon Oct 2 15:38:03 2017 SUM: 5C6EE39E
/first/juta−gj/juta/Priv−child−law−2017/23−ch23New
Failure to appear on the date and at the time which was attached to the release, or
failure to comply with any condition attached to the release, paves the way to
bringing the child back to court on a warrant of arrest or a summons. However, in
keeping with the last resort principle applicable to deprivation of liberty, this does
not automatically disqualify the child from further extra-custodial decisions.
Section 24(7)(b) requires that an inquiry into the reasons for non-appearance or
non-compliance be undertaken in order to determine whether or not the failure is
due to the fault of the child. If the failure is not the child’s fault, release on the same
conditions or on any other condition can be ordered, and, if necessary, an
appropriate order can be fashioned which would assist the child and/or his or her
family to comply with the conditions initially imposed. If it is found that the failure is
due to fault on the part of the child, the presiding officer may nevertheless order the
release of the child on different or further conditions, or may (subject to s 26) order
that the child be detained.90
Section 25 clarifies that chap 9 of the CPA applies to a bail application, except for
ss 59 and 59A, to the extent set out in s 21(2)(b) of the CJA. However, where bail is
considered to be in the interests of justice, a separate inquiry must be held into the
ability of the child or his or her parent or an appropriate adult to pay the amount of
money being considered, or any other amount.91 If after this inquiry it transpires that
bail cannot be paid, the presiding officer must set conditions for release that do not
include an amount of money. This is in line with the reasoning that if release has been
found to be an appropriate option (with deprivation of liberty as a last resort), then
ways should be sought for this to occur. Nevertheless, the 2015/2016 Annual Report
on the Implementation of the CJA tabled by the Department of Correctional Services
indicates that on 31 March 2016, 20 children were detained in prisons due to being
unable to pay bail amounts set—these amounts ranged from R300 to R2000.92
The concept of ‘secure care’ was an explicit outcome of the saga concerning the
deprivation of children’s liberty in prisons in the second half of the 1990s. Intended
to serve as a therapeutic environment that is at the same time secure, there are, at the
time of writing, 17 557 secure-care facility beds available nationally. In 2015 to 2016,
there were 5 148 admissions of children to these facilities and 4 713 releases over the
same period.93 Secure-care facilities are child and youth care centres established in
terms of chap 14 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, which are registered to provide a
programme suitable for awaiting trial (and sentenced) youth.
Where a child cannot be released from police custody prior to appearance at the
preliminary inquiry into the care of parents or guardians or on bail, placement in
secure care must be considered by the police, depending on the age of the child and
90 Section 24(7)(c) and (d).
91 Section 25(2)(b).
92 Department of Correctional Services 2015/2016 Third Annual Report: Implementation of the Child
Just Act, 75 of 2008, available at http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/2016%20doc/DCS%20Annual%
20report%202015–16%20on%20Child%20Justice%20Act%20final%20signed%20copy.pdf.
93 2015–2016 Report of the Department of Social Development on the Implementation of the Child
Justice Act (available at http://www.justice.gov.za/vg/cj/cja-anr-2015–2016.pdf at 15. Note that this
figure shows a decline in admissions and releases from the 2014/2015 year, probably due to fewer
children overall entering the child justice system.
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the alleged offence committed by the child.94 If this is not appropriate or applicable,
the child can be detained in a police cell or locked up in the interim phase.95 Where
a child is aged between 10 and 14 years, or is over the age of 14 years and charged
with a Schedule 1 or 2 offence, placement in an appropriate child and youth care
centre must be considered. Where a child over the age of 14 years is charged with a
Schedule 3 offence, however, the child may not be released from police custody or
placed in a child and youth care centre prior to the appearance at the preliminary
inquiry, but must be detained in a police cell or lock up.96 Generally, therefore, in
accordance with the policy position adopted at the time of the amendments to the
Correctional Services legislation in the 1990s, detention of children in police custody
is avoided to the extent possible, even prior to first appearance before a presiding
officer.97
23.6.5 Placement at the preliminary inquiry
If a child remains in custody at the commencement of the preliminary inquiry, a
decision has to be made concerning release or placement if the matter is not diverted.
Again, preference has to be given to the least restrictive alternative, with the odds
stacked against detention in a prison. Even when detention in a secure-care facility is
ordered, the court must take into account a list of enumerated factors, such as the
seriousness of the offence, the risk that the child may be a danger to himself or
others, and the availability of accommodation in an appropriate child and youth care
centre (with a suitable level of security).98
Referral to a prison is heavily restricted in accordance with the constitutional and
international law principle of deprivation of liberty as a last resort. The child
concerned must be aged over 14 years, the charges must relate to a Schedule 3
offence, the detention must be necessary in the interests of justice or for the safety of
the public, of the child or of other children in detention, and there must be a
likelihood of a sentence of imprisonment if the child were to be convicted.99 Further
to this, if the child is aged between 14 and 16 years, the referral to prison must be
supported by a written certificate issued by the DPP or an authorised prosecutor to
the effect that there is sufficient evidence to institute a prosecution against the child
for a Schedule 3 offence, and is charging the child with such offence.100 A child
charged with a Schedule 1 or 2 offence may exceptionally be detained in a prison if,
94 Section 26(2)(a) and s 27(a).
95 Section 26 (2)(b).
96 Section 27(b).
97 Sloth-Nielsen (2013) 26 SACJ 316 at 318–319.
98 Section 29. In S v CKM and Others 2013 (2) SACR 303 GNP, the court treated both a reform school
sentence (imposed under the Criminal Procedure Act in 2009) and subsequent detention in a
secure-care facility (after the children repeatedly absconded from the reform school), as being ‘serious
invasions of the child’s right to freedom of movement and decision making’ (para [14]).
99 Section 30(1)(b)–(e). See further the factors listed in s 30(3) that must be considered before remanding
a child to prison (such as the best interests of the child, the child’s state of health, whether the child
could be placed in an appropriate child and youth care centre, and the probable period of detention
until the conclusion of the case). These factors are based largely on the provisions crafted for the
re-amendments to the Correctional Services Act in 1996 (Sloth-Nielsen (2013) 26 SACJ 316 at 328).
100 Section 30(2).
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in addition to the other factors that must usually be considered, the presiding officer
finds that substantial and compelling reasons exist (including any relevant serious
previous convictions or pending charges against the child, warranting remanding the
child to prison—provided that the child is 14 years or older).101
The ‘shortest period of time’ principle is given effect to through the continuation
of the so-called 14 day remand rule, another carry over from the 1996 amendments to
the Correctional Services Act.102 Furthermore, the CJA specifies in s 32 how the
consideration of a further remand in detention (in a prison or in a child and youth
care centre) is to be approached by presiding officers, and these include assessing
whether detention (or placement) remains necessary, the reasons for any continued
detention to be recorded, and considering reducing any bail that has not been
paid.103 It bears noting that where a child has been remanded in detention in a child
and youth care centre pending trial (ie after the conclusion of a preliminary inquiry),
the postponement of the matter may not exceed 30 days at a time.104
Have these strict controls over detention of children been effective? Here the
Department of Correctional Services (DCS) Annual Report on the Implementation of
the Child Justice Act for 2015/2016 is instructive. An average of 346 children were
incarcerated in DCS facilities in 2010, the year of commencement of the CJA,
according to Annexure A of the Report. On 31 March 2010, the actual headcount was
504 children in remand detention. This has declined steadily to an average of 167
children for 2014, and a snapshot figure for 31 March 2016 was 136 children in
remand custody in correctional facilities nationally.105
This encouraging data indicates that secure care has indeed come to replace
detention in adult prisons as the preferred option where deprivation of liberty is
ordered, and that the number of children remanded to await trial in prison continues
to decline.
23.7 ASSESSMENT, DIVERSION PROCEDURES AND DIVERSION
PROGRAMMES
23.7.1 Assessment
Assessment was introduced as a screening process to assist in locating parents or
guardians, to determine the pre-trial placement of a child, to advise the prosecution
on the possibilities for the child to be diverted, and to provide the court with a brief
social background report. It has always in practice been the function of social
workers (acting as probation officers) employed by the DSD. Ensuring the assessment
101 Section 30(5). Reasons must be entered on the record for such an order (s 30(6)).
102 This rule, now encapsulated in s 30(4), provides that where a child is remanded in custody to a prison,




105 There were 28 children who had multiple cases against them.
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of children under the CJA is one of the ten key priority areas identified in the National
Policy Framework on Child Justice.106
Although the CJA does not define assessment, its role can be derived from s 4 of the
Probation Services Act 116 of 1991 which describes some of the functions of a
probation officer107 to include ‘receiving, assessing and referring an accused and
rendering early intervention services and programmes, including mediation and
family group conferencing’ and ‘investigating the circumstances of an accused and
providing a pre-trial report recommending the desirability or otherwise of
prosecution’. The Probation Services Act also includes a definition of assessment as a
‘process of developmental assessment or evaluation of a person, the family
circumstances of a person, the nature and circumstances surrounding the alleged
commission of an offence, its impact upon the victim, the attitude of the alleged
offender in relation to the offence and any other relevant factor’. Assessment is now
encapsulated in a dedicated chapter of the CJA, namely chap 3. Its purposes are
clearly spelt out in s 35, namely to ascertain whether the child should be referred to
the children’s court (as a child in need of care and protection); to estimate the child’s
age if this is uncertain;108 to gather information relating to previous convictions or
previous diversions or any pending charges; to formulate recommendations
concerning the release, detention and placement of the child; to establish the
prospects for diversion of the matter; to establish what measures should be taken in
respect of a child aged below 10 years; to express a view on whether a child aged
between 10 and 14 years should be referred for an expert evaluation of that child’s
criminal capacity; to determine whether a child has been used by an adult to commit
the crime in question; and to provide any other relevant information which the
probation officer regards to be in the child’s best interest or which may further any
objective the CJA seeks to achieve. The recommendations which flow from the
process are listed in s 40 of the CJA. This section further elaborates that it may be
recommended that the child be referred for further and more detailed assessment.109
Section 40(3) prescribes the circumstance when this might occur, namely where
there is a possibility that the child may be a danger to others or himself or herself; the
fact that that child has a history of repeatedly committing offences or absconding;
where the social welfare history of the child warrants a further assessment; and
where there is a possibility that the child may be admitted to a sexual offenders
programme, a substance abuse programme or other intensive treatment programme.
In some of these instances, medical reports may be required. A longer period of time
is allowed in these instances because the services of other professionals might have
106 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Child Justice Act, 2008 (Act 75 of 2008)
National Policy Framework (May 2010) available at http://www.justice.gov.za/vg/cj/2010_NPF_
ChildJustice_tabled21may.pdf.
107 Probation has recently (in 2015) been declared a speciality of social work and regulations have been
promulgated to enable registration in that field. See the 2015/2016 Department of Social
Development Report on the Implementation of the Child Justice Act (available at http://
www.justice.gov.za/vg/cj/cja-anr-2015–2016.pdf).
108 Regulation 14 provides that this must be done on a form which corresponds substantially to Form 3 of
the annexure to the regulations.
109 Section 40 (1)(g). Further and more detailed assessment are not defined.
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to be sought (s 48(4)(a) allows the preliminary inquiry to be remanded for periods
not exceeding 14 days in these instances).
The information obtained from the assessment interview must be noted in a
written report. Regulation 27 gives some guidance as to the level of detail that the
report should contain, and requires that it must be logical and motivate any
recommendations made. The regulation adds that the report should express an
opinion as to the possible reasons for the child having committed the offence,
express an opinion as to the extent to which the child has been influenced by adults
or peers, indicate the child’s ability to be reintegrated into society, and indicate
whether the child acknowledges responsibility for the offence110 (which is necessary
if the child is to be considered for diversion).
The obligation to undertake assessment rests in respect of every child alleged to
have committed an offence, unless assessment has been dispensed with. Assessment
can be dispensed with where a prosecutor diverts a child charged with a Schedule 1
offence prior to appearance before a preliminary inquiry, provided that dispensing
with the yet to be conducted assessment is in the best interests of the child.111 It can
also be dispensed with by an inquiry magistrate if the child appears at a preliminary
inquiry without having been assessed, and dispensing with assessment is in the best
interests of the child.112
Where a probation officer has been notified by a police officer of the fact that a
child under the age of 10 years has been suspected of having committed an offence,
the assessment must be effected within 7 days of the notification.113 For children
above the age of 10 years, the time periods differ depending on whether the child has
been arrested and remains in detention (in which case it must be effected within a
48-hour period prior to the first appearance of the child at a preliminary inquiry),114
or whether the child has been served a written notice or summons to appear, in
which case the notice or summons will determined when the child must appear
before a preliminary inquiry, and the assessment will have to take place prior to that
appearance.
Assessment may take place at any suitable place identified by the probation officer,
which may include a court, at a police station or at the offices of the DSD.115 The
location should be conducive to privacy. The probation officer is mandated to make
every effort to locate a parent or an appropriate adult to attend the assessment, and
may request a police official to assist in this regard.116 A child’s parent or an
appropriate adult must attend the assessment unless exempted from attending by the
probation officer, or is excluded for disruptive, undermining or obstructionist
behaviour.117 Other persons permitted to attend include a diversion service provider,
a researcher, or another person whose presence is necessary or desirable for the
110 This is also provided for in s 40(4) of the CJA.
111 Section 41(3).
112 Section 47(5). Reasons for dispensing with the assessment must be entered on the record.
113 Section 34(3).
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completion of the assessment.118 The probation officer is empowered to consult with
any person who may provide relevant information during the assessment process,119
and may consult privately with any person present at any stage.120 Additional
information obtained from a consultation with a person not present at the assessment
must be shared with the child.121
Should a probation officer recommend placement of a child in a secure-care facility
pending the finalisation of proceedings, the CJA requires that information be
obtained as to the availability or otherwise of accommodation in such facility, and
that the level of security and the available amenities and features are spelt out.
Regulation 27 refers to the need to utilise the template in Form 5 for the sworn
statement of the manager of the facility to record this information.
Recent information on the implementation of assessment has become available.
The consolidated Annual Report on the Implementation of the Child Justice Act for
2012/2013 indicates that for the 2010/2011 financial year, 32 500 assessments were
conducted; this dropped to 18 334 in the year that followed, and climbed again to 32
125 for the 2012/2013 financial year. The 2015/2016 Report by the Department of
Social Development on the Implementation of the Child Justice Act122 records that
for that year, 206 assessments were performed in respect of children aged below the
age of 10 years (and it is noted that this is a decrease of 11 compared to the previous
year), whilst 23 787 children aged over 10 years were assessed. The data appears
nevertheless to indicate a dropping number of children entering the child justice
system overall, as 5 040 fewer assessment were performed than the previous year.
23.7.2 Diversion procedures
Since diversion was intended to be the centrepiece of the child justice system, and
the preferred response to juvenile offending where possible, the CJA has dealt with
diversion extensively.123 The objectives of diversion – to deal with the child outside
the formal criminal justice system, to avoid the child getting a criminal record, to
prevent stigmatisation and to promote the reintegration of the child into his or her
family and community, are spelt out in detail in s 51 of the CJA. So, too, the CJA lays
down the general conditions for diversion to be considered, namely that the child
acknowledges responsibility for the offence, that there is a prima facie case against
the child, that the child and the parent (or appropriate adult or guardian) consent to
diversion, and that the prosecutor agrees that the matter be diverted.124 A key goal of





122 Available at http://www.justice.gov.za/vg/cj/cja-anr-2015–2016.pdf.
123 Wakefield ‘The CRC in South Africa 15 years on: does the new Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 comply
with international children’s rights instruments?’ (2011) 62 Northern Ireland Law Quarterly 167.
Wakefield argued that the provisions are too detailed and speculated that this might have been the
cause of the declining numbers of children being referred for diversion. However, this view,
expressed at the initial stages of implementation of the CJA, is debatable.
124 Section 52(1).
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offence with which they were charged, would be eligible for diversion—in
compliance with art 40(3)(b) of the CRC. This position has been enshrined in the
CJA, albeit that with respect to serious offences, children may be diverted only with
the express written consent of the DPP and in exceptional circumstances (see para
23.7.2.2 below).
In the same vein, child rights advocates motivated that a child should not be
excluded from diversion on the grounds that he or she had already previously been
diverted. They argued that a more intense or onerous diversion option should be
possible, so as to avoid the negative aspects of a criminal trial. This too has been the
ultimate position adopted in the CJA.125
23.7.2.1 Prosecutorial diversion
Chapter 6 deals with diversion by a prosecutor prior to a child appearing before a
preliminary inquiry. This power is, however, limited by the offence category for
which the child has been charged, as only Schedule 1 offences may be considered for
prosecutorial diversion. Section 41(1)(a)126 spells out that this form of diversion may
only be effected if the child accepts responsibility for the offence; if the child has not
been unduly influenced to acknowledge responsibility; if there is a prima facie case
against the child; if the child, his or her parents, guardian or an appropriate adult
consent to diversion; and, where the child is over 10 but under 14 years, the
prosecutor is satisfied that criminal capacity is likely to be proved. Furthermore, the
Act requires that such diversions take place in accordance with the Directives issued
by the NDPP.127
Section G of these Directives deals with prosecutorial diversion before a
preliminary inquiry. This section adds several further possible steps to the process.
Directive G2 provides that although the prosecutor’s decision can be made
summarily, the investigating officer and/or victim or any person with a direct interest
in the affairs of the victim should be consulted if they are readily available. Directive
G3 notes that even where diversion is decided upon, the child, and where possible
his or her parents, must appear before a magistrate in chambers in order to have the
diversion option made an order of court. If the prosecutor has dispensed with
assessment, the reasons must be provided to the magistrate to be entered on the
record.
The Directives also add criteria to guide decision-making. Directive G6 states that
prosecutorial diversion should not be used where the offence is of a serious nature
due to its facts or circumstances (even if it is a Schedule 1 offence). So, too, if the
125 National Directive F8 advises prosecutors that ‘all efforts must be made to establish whether the child
has previously been diverted. A diversion may still be considered despite a previous diversion or the
existence of a previous conviction if the child will benefit from the proposed programs and if the
child, all circumstances taken into account, should be afforded another such opportunity. Diversion is
not suitable if it will bring the administration of justice into disrepute’. The Department of Social
Development is mandated by s 60 of the CJA to maintain a record of children in respect of whom a
diversion order has been made in terms of the Act with identifying details of the child, the offence, the
diversion option, and particulars of the child’s compliance with the diversion order.
126 Cross-reference to s 52(1)(a)–(e).
127 Published in GN R252 in GG 33067 of 31 March 2010.
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child has a previous conviction, previous diversion or a pending charge in respect of
a similar or more serious offence. Then a variety of circumstances indicate that
summary diversion should be excluded—these are the factors leading to a child being
a child in need of care and protection as spelt out by s 150 of the Children’s Act 38 of
2005.
The National Directives specify that the overall responsibility for deciding on
diversion rests with the prosecution, and further that prosecutors are not required by
the Act to give reasons for their decision, although they should keep a record of their
reasons for non-diversion in the diary of the docket.128
23.7.2.2 Diversion at the preliminary inquiry
One of the central objectives of the newly introduced preliminary inquiry procedure
(see para 23.8 below) is to establish whether the matter can be diverted before plea.
The consideration of the assessment report provides that platform for this decision to
be made. In general, the preliminary inquiry will consider the following matters for
possible diversion: cases involving Schedule 1 offences where the matter has not
already been diverted by the prosecutor (or withdrawn); cases involving Schedule 2
offences (provided the accused acknowledges responsibility for the commission of
the offence); and for offences falling under Schedule 3, provided that the DPP has
given written consent for diversion, in exceptional circumstances. This power may
not be delegated.129
Criteria to guide the DPPs in the exercise of the latter discretion have been issued
in the National Directive promulgated in terms of s 97(4)(a) of the Act. Directive J
lists the following ‘exceptional circumstance’ which may motivate the DPP to permit
diversion for a Schedule 3 offence: particular youthfulness; low developmental level
of the child; presence of particular hardship, vulnerability or handicap (eg a child
heading a household); where the victim prefers diversion as she or he does not want
to testify in court; compelling mitigating circumstances such as diminished
responsibility; undue influence upon the child (as where the child is used by adults to
commit an offence); where there are fragile or unwilling prosecution witnesses; and
where to proceed would be potentially damaging to a child witness or victim. It is
worthy of note that a number of these circumstance pertain to the witness or victim,
rather than attaching to the accused. It is further compulsory for the DPP, prior to
issuing the written permission, to consult with the investigating officer and with the
victim, in terms of s 51(3)(b) and Directive J3.130
Review courts have had several opportunities to scrutinise diversions effected by
lower courts. Mujuzi131 discusses the case of Sobekwa in which the diversion order
was set aside because of the failure on the part of the prosecutor to obtain written
128 Directives F3 and 4.
129 Section 51(3)(d) of the CJA. The written indication must be handed to the presiding officer and forms
part of the record.
130 Unlike the situation for diversion of Schedule 3 offences, a prosecutor diverting a Schedule 1 or 2
offence may consider the views of the victim and consult the investigating officer.
131 Mujuzi ‘Diversion in the South African criminal justice system: emerging jurisprudence’ (2015) 28
SACJ 40.
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authorisation for diversion as required by s 52(3)(a).132 The offence in question was
armed robbery.
He also refers to Rabupape133 which involved a charge of culpable homicide due
to the accused driving a motor vehicle recklessly and without a license. Since this
charge appears on Schedule 2, the prosecutor should have consulted with the family
of the victim before a decision to divert was taken, the review court pointed out.
In S v M,134 the review court observed that:
Inquiry magistrates are encouraged to adopt a more active role in giving effect to the aims
and objectives set out in the CJA. In these instances (as in the present matters) where
children are charged with very serious offences, lower courts should ensure that they
comply fully with the provisions of the CJA before making diversion orders that result in
a complete failure of justice.135
This comment applies with equal force to the selection of diversion options or
programmes, discussed next.
23.7.3 Diversion programmes and options
The SALRC was motivated to ensure the widest possible access to diversion,
including for persons who may previously have been diverted, for offenders charged
with more serious offences, and for those living in more remote areas where
traditional programme service providers did not operate. Two consequences of this
were (first) the division of diversion options into two levels136 to indicate that more
serious offences could be considered for more onerous diversion conditions, and
(second) the development of ‘tailor-made’ options which did not depend on a
programme provider but could nevertheless be applied on a case by case basis, and
monitored by DSD or some other appointee.
When selecting a diversion option, the principle of proportionality must be
considered, as well as the nature of the offence, interests of society, and individual
circumstances of the child (including educational level, cognitive ability, domestic
and environmental circumstances, age and developmental needs).137
The options at level 1 are intended for Schedule 1 offences and include an apology,
a formal caution with or without conditions, placement under one of a list of orders,
referral to counselling or therapy, attendance at an educational or vocational
programme, restitution, community service, and payment of compensation. The full
array of options is detailed in s 53(3) of the CJA. The duration of a level 1 diversion is
132 S v Sobekwa [2013] JOL 30901 (ECG). See further Sloth-Nielsen ‘Recent developments in child
justice’ (2015) 28 SACJ 437, for details of S v M and Others (HC AR401/14), dealt with as a special
review instituted by the DPP after written authorisation was not obtained and an inappropriate
diversion option was selected (for charges of armed robbery and possession of an unlicensed firearm);
and S v M (HC AR 186/15) which concerned charges under the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000 which
falls under Schedule 3, owing to the maximum sentence that may be imposed—again written consent
was not obtained and the proceedings were therefore not in accordance with justice.
133 S v Rabupape 2015 (2) SACR 497 (GP) .
134 (HC AR 186/15).
135 Paragraph [31].
136 The SALRC had proposed three levels, but this was considered to be too complicated when the
Parliamentary debates took place.
137 Badenhorst ‘Diversion provisions in terms of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008’ (2013) 26 SACJ 302.
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a maximum of 12 months where the child is aged below 14 years, and 24 months
where the child is 14 years or older.
At level 2, which can be used for Schedule 2 and 3 offences, some of the options at
level one are included (but not all); further, the option of compulsory attendance at a
specified place for education or vocational purposes which may include a period of
residence is listed; as well as referral for intensive therapy which may include periods
of residence and placement under the supervision of a probation officer coupled with
restrictions on movement outside of the magisterial district in which the child resides
without prior written approval of the probation officer.138
The maximum time periods allocated for level 2 diversion orders also indicates that
they are intended to be more intensive than level 1 diversion orders, and of longer
duration. Section 54(6) provides for 24 months for a child aged below 14 years for a
level 2 diversion order, and up to 48 months for a child aged over 14 years.
Restorative justice options include referral to a family group conference or to
victim offender mediation (or any other restorative justice option).139 These may
replace or be used in combination with any other diversion option (they do not resort
under either level 1 or level 2).140
When making a diversion order, a probation officer or other suitable person must
be appointed to monitor the child’s compliance with the order.141 Failure to comply
must be reported to the magistrate or child justice court (as the case may be).142 The
child can then be re-arrested or otherwise brought back to the system to enquire as to
the reasons for his or her failure to comply.143 If the failure was not due to the fault of
the child, the same option can be imposed with or without altered conditions or
another appropriate order can be made which will assist the child or his or her family
to comply with the diversion option.144 Only where the failure is due to the fault of
the child, can the steps outlined in s 58(4) ensure, namely the prosecutor can decide
to continue with the prosecution, or another more onerous diversion option can be
imposed.
The legal effect of diversion is that, once it has been complied with, no further
prosecution on the same facts may be instituted,145 but it does not count as a
previous conviction.146 The DSD must keep a register of all diversions (to ensure that
children do not qualify repeatedly for diversion options which are not serving any
deterrent purpose),147 but the records of diversion fall away automatically when the
child reaches the age of 21 years, unless the child has been convicted of another
offence or failed to comply with the diversion order.148
138 Section 53(4). See Badenhorst (2013) 26 SACJ 302.
139 For more detail on the procedural aspects, see ss 61 and 62 of the CJA.
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Case law on the selection of diversion options and the manner in which they have
been given force is useful. In S v M149 the magistrate had erred in imposing a
reporting order as the chosen diversion option (s 53(1)(d) and Form 6 of the CJA),
whereas this is reserved for level 1 diversions. A reporting order is not competent
where the charge relates to a Schedule 2 or 3 offence, in this instance the accused
was charged with armed robbery and possession of an unlicensed firearm. This
rendered the proceedings flawed and irregular. Furthermore, the magistrate
presiding at the Child Justice Court appeared to have finalised the diverted matter
immediately, instead of postponing the mater pending the receipt from a probation
officer of a compliance certificate indicating that the diversion had been successfully
completed (s 67(1)(b) of the CJA).
Again, in S v M,150 the imposition of a supervision and guidance order in
accordance with s 53(3)(c) of the CJA was not competent, as at least a level 2
diversion option ought to have been selected (since the charges related to
contraventions of the Firearms Control Act of 2000. The court also pointed out that
Form 6, which recorded the diversion, left much to be desired regarding the manner
in which it was filled out. Crosses were inserted in the first eight diversion options,
leaving the impression that all eight had been selected, relating to the eight options
detailed in s 53(1)(a)–(f). However, only Part F of Form 6 was subsequently
completed, meaning that reg 29(3)(a) of the regulations to the CJA was not complied
with (this regulation provides that the diversion orders in s 53(1)(a)–(g) must
correspond substantially with Part A–F of Form 6).
Similar concerns about incorrect application of the diversion provisions of the CJA
emanated from the special review brought in S v S and Others (AR 660/2014) also in
KwaZulu-Natal. Faced with charges of contravention of an ordinance proscribing
illegal hunting, three children were diverted and the following orders imposed: a
compulsory school attendance order (s 53(1)(a) of the CJA); a family time order (s
53(1)(b) of the CJA); a good behaviour order (s 53(1) of the CJA); a supervision order
(s 53(4)(d) of the CJA; and attendance at a diversion programme offered by an
accredited diversion service provider. However, this particular combination order
was incorrect, as the offence in question was a Schedule 2 offence due to the
maximum penalty that could be imposed upon conviction.151
The above cases highlight the importance of judicial officers paying meticulous
attention to the ipsissima verbi of the CJA when crafting diversion orders.
Accreditation of diversion programmes is provided for by s 58 of the CJA to be
effected by the DSD. The most recent results of the accreditation process were
gazetted on 13 March 2015 and Government Gazette 38794 has reference. During
the 2015/2016 year, a total of 49 diversion service providers received full
accreditation, whilst 13 were awarded candidacy status.152 A total of 121
149 HC AR401/14 (as discussed by Sloth-Nielsen (2015) 28 SACJ 437).
150 HR 186/15 (as discussed by Sloth-Nielsen (2015) 28 SACJ 437).
151 Also discussed by Sloth-Nielsen (2015) 28 SACJ 437.
152 DSD report on the Implementation of the Child Justice Act 2015/2016 available at http://
www.justice.gov.za/vg/cj/cja-anr-2015–2016.pdf.
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programmes received approval, with 28 being awarded candidacy status.153 These
figures represent an increase on previous accreditation data, which the DSD
attributes to an increase in entrants to the child justice fraternity, and improvements
in the services of organisation that previously only enjoyed candidacy status.
Quality assurance panels (appointed provincially) monitor the diversion service
providers and their programmes. Finally, the 2015/2016 Report records that 8 830
children were referred to diversion programmes according to DSD data (2 383 fewer
than the previous year); and 3 497 were placed under home based supervision (the
number in 2014/2015 was 5 529). The National Prosecuting Authority Report on the
Implementation of the Child Justice Act 2015/2016 reports that according to their
statistics, 8 121 children were diverted.
Clearly, the merging of data from different departments and sources provides some
anomalies when the numbers do not tie up; nevertheless, that the CJA has succeeded
in mainstreaming diversion seems incontrovertible.
23.8 THE PRELIMINARY INQUIRY PROCEDURE
The preliminary inquiry has been described as the ‘centrepiece’ of the new child
justice system. The purpose of this new procedure was to introduce a compulsory
pre-trial procedure, at which diversion must be considered, before the matter
proceeds to trial in a formal court. This background also provides the rationale for
some of the other objectives of the preliminary inquiry—to ensure deprivation of
liberty is used as a last resort; to ensure that assessment is undertaken by a probation
officer, and that the report emanating from that assessment is considered by the role
players present (including the inquiry magistrate and the prosecutor); that children
who are evidently in need of care and protection are referred to the children’s court
to be dealt with in terms of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005; and that the views of all
present are taken into consideration, including those of the child.
The preliminary inquiry has also been characterised as performing a gatekeeping
role—ensuring that only cases where children who do not admit responsibility for
the offence, or those who cannot be diverted, proceed beyond this ‘barrier’ to plea
and trial in a court. It was designed against the backdrop of uneven access to
diversion during the period before the implementation of the Act when it was
predicated only on prosecutorial goodwill. It is a compulsory procedure (except
where a child is aged below 10 years, or the matter has already been diverted by a
prosecutor, or the matter has been withdrawn). It is regarded as the first appearance
in court, and must therefore be convened within 48 hours of the arrest of a child (if
arrested).154
Section 43 spells out the nature and objectives of the preliminary inquiry, as
outlined in the paragraph above. Section 44 explains that the persons who are
mandated to attend the preliminary inquiry include the child, his or her parent or
153 Eighteen service providers and programmes were declined as they did not meet the requisite criteria.
154 If the child has been served with a summons or written notice to appear, the time frames specific to
that summons or notice will apply concerning the date upon which the child must appear at the
preliminary inquiry.
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guardian, the probation officer, a diversion service provider if one has been identified
by the probation officer, and with the permission of the inquiry magistrate, any other
person with an interest in attending or who may contribute to the inquiry.155 The Act
does not specify that a legal representative must be in attendance—it was thought
that the child may not yet have secured legal representation at this early stage of the
process. However, the legal representative is not excluded from attending, and in
practice, with the widespread availability of legal representation through Legal Aid
South Africa (see para 23.11 below), it appears that most children are in fact
supported by a legal representative at the preliminary inquiry.156
The proceedings at the preliminary inquiry are confidential and no information
furnished by any person at a preliminary inquiry may be used against the child during
bail applications, plea, or subsequent trials. This is reinforced by s 47(10) which
disallows an inquiry magistrate, who has presided over such an inquiry and heard any
information prejudicial to the determination of the matter, from presiding over a
subsequent proceeding, procedure or trial involving that child.157
The procedure that this ‘informal round table’158 follows is inquisitorial in nature:
s 47 prescribes that the inquiry magistrate must conduct the proceedings, asking the
necessary questions and eliciting information. A record must be kept. At the start, the
inquiry magistrate must explain the purposes of the inquiry to the child, its
inquisitorial nature, the nature of the charges against the child, inform the child of his
or her rights, and explain to the child the immediate procedures to be followed in
terms of the Act.159 Since diversion is a central objective, it must be ascertained
whether the child accepts responsibility for the offence at the outset. If the child does
not acknowledge responsibility, then the CJA provides that no further questions
regarding the alleged offence may be put to the child, and no information concerning
a previous diversion or conviction against the child may be placed before the
preliminary inquiry.160 The matter would then be set down for trial in a child justice
court (see para 9 below), once the issue of detention or release has been determined
and a child’s right to legal representation explained to him.161
In order for the preliminary inquiry to make a decision on diversion, the probation
officer’s assessment report must be placed before it (if available). Section 47(5) of the
CJA permits assessment that has not yet been effected to be dispensed with, if it is in
the best interests of the child to do so (and reasons must then be entered on the
record). The preliminary inquiry may also require documentation necessary to
establish the child’s age; documentation relating to previous convictions or pending
155 Parents, guardians and other appropriate adults may be exempted from attending, and persons may
be excluded if their attendance is not in the best interests of the child.
156 Communication by a representative from Legal Aid South Africa, and the expert workshop on the
Minimum Age of Criminal Capacity, Pretoria, February 2015.
157 In practice, where there is only one magistrate in that jurisdiction, this means that in the (few) cases
where the child is not diverted, and prejudicial information has come to light, another magistrate has
to be brought in to preside over subsequent proceedings.
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charges; the police report concerning detention of the child in police custody; and
any other relevant information.162
The inquiry magistrate is tasked with hearing the views of all persons present at the
preliminary inquiry, and ensuring the participation of the child and his or her parents
or guardians.163 Where children are co-accused in the same matter, a joint
preliminary inquiry may be held, although different decisions may be reached in
respect of each child.164
The prosecutor remains dominis litis, and to this end must agree to the matter
being diverted if this is what the inquiry magistrate has in mind. If the prosecution
does not agree to diversion, the matter must be set down for plea in the child justice
court. In S v LR,165 a review was instituted by the prosecution when a magistrate
agreed to diversion at the request of the defence attorney, in the face of prosecutorial
opposition. The diversion was in these circumstances ultra vires and the order of the
court a quo was set aside. Mujuzi166 agrees that a child’s lawyer may not apply for
diversion, as this can only be done by a prosecutor or the DPP.
In S v M and Z167 it was confirmed that the preliminary inquiry is mandatory. In
this matter, two children were facing (evidently, as this was poorly recorded) charges
of robbery with aggravating circumstances and possession of an unlicensed firearm.
The second child did not, however, appear at a preliminary inquiry and his name was
added to the charge sheet when the matter was set down for trial in the child justice
court. The court noted that the failure to bring the child to appear at a preliminary
inquiry constituted an irregularity (in addition to other misdirections that occurred).
In S v Thwala,168 the court confirmed the peremptory nature of the preliminary
inquiry and set aside the conviction of a girl of 14 years, whose age had been
incorrectly recorded on the charge sheet as 19, until it was correctly established via a
pre-sentence report. The matter was remitted to a preliminary inquiry to be
convened before a different magistrate.
Even though it was an interlocutory procedure, the CJA provides for the possibility
of postponement of the proceedings: s 48 contemplates the postponement where
the child is in detention for a period of 48 hours, where the prosecutor indicates that
diversion is being considered, but that an assessment has not yet been done. A
postponement to this end may also be effected to (amongst others) secure the
attendance of a person essential to the inquiry, to obtain essential information, to
establish the views of the victim regarding diversion, and to make arrangements for a
specific programme. One further period of 48 hours is allowed for a postponement of
the preliminary inquiry, but only if this is likely to increase the prospects of diversion
(bearing in mind that the accused might be in custody during this period). After the
162 Section 47(3) and (4). The inquiry may also elicit any information from any person at the inquiry, and
take steps to establish the truth of any statement or correctness of any submission made.
163 Section 47(7). The child and his or her parent/guardian must be allowed to ask questions and raise
pertinent issues.
164 Section 47(8).
165 2015 (2) SACR 497.
166 Mujuzi (2015) 28 SACJ 40.
167 Sloth-Nielsen (2013) 26 SACJ 316.
168 [2015] ZAGPPHC 114 (26 February 2015).
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expiry of this second postponement, the preliminary inquiry must be closed and set
down for trial in a child justice court.169 The preliminary inquiry can be postponed
where the child is in need of medical treatment or for an assessment regarding
whether the child has a mental illness in accordance with ss 77 or 78 of the Criminal
Procedure Act.170
According to the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Annual
Report on the Implementation of the Child Justice Act 2015/2016,171 preliminary
inquiries are one of ten key priority areas for the implementation of the CJA. The
most recent data shows that 18 575 preliminary inquiries were held in that reporting
year (down from 25 517 in 2012/2013). This is probably due to the overall drop in
children entering the child justice system.
As regards the outcomes of preliminary inquiry, the same report records these in
some detail. There were 3 026 cases referred from the inquiry to the child justice
court; 89 to the children’s court; and some 4 500 cases were diverted (though the
vast preponderance of these (3 495) were s 41 diversions, ie prosecutorial
diversions).172 A study to determine the effectiveness and usefulness of the
preliminary inquiry procedure is evidently being planned. However, this preliminary
data suggests that the procedure does serve its intended purpose of increasing access
to diversion.
23.9 TRIALS IN A CHILD JUSTICE COURT
If a case has not been diverted, the matter must be set down for trial in the child
justice court. These are not physically separate structures, but ordinary courts which
function in line with the rules provided in chap 9 of the Act. As a general proposition,
the court will apply the provisions of the CPA, save where the CJA provides
otherwise. Where a child is co-accused with an adult, the court will apply the CJA to
the child and the CPA to the adult.173
The CJA mandates a more active role for the presiding officer than is usual in South
Africa’s adversarial system. Section 63(4) requires that the presiding officer ensure
that the child’s best interests are upheld during the trial, and, to this end, allows the
presiding officer to elicit any information from any person involved in the
proceedings, mandates him or her to ensure that the proceedings are fair and not
unduly hostile to the child, as well as that they are conducted in a manner
169 Section 48(2). Section 48(4) permits postponements of 14 days for the purposes of ‘further and
detailed assessment’ upon the recommendation of a probation officer. Such could be a mental health
evaluation for which specialist intervention is required, or a medical assessment for drug addiction (to
cite two possibilities). A 14-day remand is also mandated where the written authorisation of the DPP
for a s 52(3) diversion is required.
170 Section 48(5).
171 Available at http://www.justice.gov.za/vg/childjustice.html.
172 Other outcomes were cases that were withdrawn, were struck off the roll or were still pending (the
largest number at 10 033, ie more than half of the total numbers of preliminary inquiries held).
173 Section 63(2).
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appropriate to the age and maturity of the child. This is certainly a nod in the
direction of a child-friendly justice process.174
As was the case previously under the CPA, children appearing at trial have the right
to parental assistance.175 Such person(s) can be subpoenaed to appear. Their
assistance may be dispensed with if the parent or guardians cannot be traced after
reasonable efforts, and further delay would be prejudicial to the best interests of the
child or to the administration of justice. If no assistance is afforded by a parent,
guardian or appropriate adult, but the child nevertheless requires assistance, the
court may in exceptional circumstances appoint an independent observer176 to assist
the child. The role of the parent or person assisting is not to act as legal
representative of the child, but to provide moral and psychosocial support. It is
unclear to what extent previous case law on this issue, under s 73 of the CPA (which
provided for parental assistance), remains of relevance (given that previously one
function of the parent was to question witnesses, whereas now all defendants facing
trial in a child justice court will be legally represented and this will be the function of
that representative: see para 23.11 below).
Children’s privacy rights receive recognition in s 63(5) and (6). Both have been the
subject of litigation. In Media 24 Ltd v National Prosecuting Authority,177 in which
one of the accused was aged below 18 years at the time of the trial, various media
houses applied for permission to be present during the trial on the grounds of public
interest. Due to the high-profile status of the deceased victim there was heightened
public interest in the matter. Whilst s 63(5) did allow for such a discretion to be
exercised by the presiding officer, it had to be interpreted in the light of the best
interests of the child standard in the Constitution, the court held. This principle did
not, however, trump the principle of open access to justice (‘justice being seen to be
done’) and the public interest generally. The court held that due to the exceptional
circumstances surrounding this case, the child’s right to privacy could be limited;
however, this had to be effected in the least restrictive manner. Consequently, limited
access to a specified number of media representatives via a closed-circuit television
room was permitted, and the child’s face was to be concealed. No publication of the
identifying details of the minor was allowed.
However, when he turned 18 years old during the course of the trial, his details
were made public in the press, who have taken the view that the prohibition on
publication of identifying details of a child accused ceases to have effect when they
reach the age of 18 years.178 This is the subject of pending litigation: to determine the
174 See the Council of Europe’s Guidelines on Child-friendly Justice (2010) and the Guidelines on Action
for Children in the Justice System in Africa (2011) (endorsed by the African Committee of Experts on
the Rights and Welfare of the Child, available at http://srsg.violenceagainstchildren.org/sites/default/
files/documents/docs/Guidelines_on_action_in_the_Justice_system_in_Africa.pdf).
175 Although this has (as elsewhere in the CJA) been expanded to include not only a parent or guardian
but also an appropriate adult.
176 A representative from a community or organisation, or from a community police forum: s 1 of the CJA.
177 Media 24 Ltd and Others v National Prosecuting Authority and Others (Media Monitoring Africa as
Amicus Curiae): In Re S v Mahlangu and Another 2011 (2) SACR 321 (GNP).
178 The same view has been taken regarding the publication of details of victims who reach 18 years.
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scope and reach of the prohibition contained in s 63(6). The outcome is, at the time
of writing, still awaited.
The CJA clarifies that diversion is possible even during trial, provided that it takes
place at any time before conclusion of the case for the prosecution.179 In S v MK,180
the review court confirmed that the option of diversion can be considered at any time
during the trial, and that the regional magistrate had wrongly jettisoned the option of
diversion to the prejudice of the accused. This constituted a misdirection.
In an effort to ensure that children’s trials are concluded speedily, especially where
they are deprived of their liberty in the awaiting trial period, s 66 of the CJA provides
for time limits related to postponements. The maximum period is 14 days where the
child is detained in prison, 30 days where the child is deprived of his or her liberty in
a child and youth care centre, and 60 days where a child has been released. Despite
proposals for an overall maximum period being set, within which children’s trials
must be concluded that were discussed by the SALRC, no such maximum limits (eg 6
months or 1 year) were ultimately accepted for inclusion in the CJA.
The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Annual Report on the
Implementation of the Child Justice Act for 2015/2016 provides information on the
number of trials held in child justice courts. There were 9 995 trials postponed during
this period. There were findings of guilty in 181 trials, not guilty findings in 154 trials,
635 matters were withdrawn and 239 were struck off the roll. As the report points
out, there has been a significant decrease of 73 per cent181 in the number of
outcomes recorded in the child justice court. However, they do ascribe this partly at
least to changes in the manner in which details are captured, and undertake to revisit
the relevant data. Nevertheless, the low number of completed trials (181 guilty
findings and 154 not guilty findings) appears alarmingly low.
23.10 SENTENCING
Youth has long been a mitigating factor in sentencing in South African
jurisprudence.182 As highlighted in this chapter, alternatives to imprisonment for
children underscored the commencement of a separate child justice system for
children from as early as 1879, with the founding of the first reformatory. However,
as Karels et al point out,183 the system still largely treated child offenders in the same
way as adult offenders, and the sentencing option for child offenders were broadly
identical to adult offenders. However, the sentencing regime now established under
the CJA has been profoundly affected by the constitution, notably via the abolition of
juvenile whipping as a sentence in S v Williams184 (on the basis of its inconsistency
179 Section 67(1).
180 2012 (2) (SACR 533 (GSJ).
181 By way of comparison, the 2014–2015 statistics were as follows: 8 855 postponed, 637 guilty, 328 not
guilty, 1 295 withdrawn and 999 stuck off the roll. The number of postponements far outweighs
concluded cases.
182 S v Lehnberg 1975 (4) SA 533 (A); Director of Public Prosecutions, KwaZulu-Natal v P 2006 (3) SA
515 (SCA).
183 Karels et al Child Offenders in South African Criminal Justice: Concepts and Process (2014) 2.
184 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC).
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with the right to freedom from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment in s 12) and the provisions of s 28(1)(g).
The leading case on sentencing is arguably Centre for Child Law v Minister for
Justice and Constitutional Development.185 This constitutional challenge was the
product of a legislative amendment which sought to overturn the effects of an earlier
Supreme Court of Appeal decision186 which had declared that the imposition of a
mandatory prescribed sentencing regime upon children aged 16 and 17 convicted of
specified serious offences, was at odds with the principle of deprivation of liberty for
the shortest appropriate period of time, since the prescribed sentence disallowed an
individualised response to the determination of sentence which would not take, as
the starting point, the longest period of time for calculating the period of
imprisonment. Agreeing with the argument of the Centre for Child Law, acting on
behalf of all children who might be sentenced under such an amended scheme, the
Constitutional Court ruled the amending legislation unconstitutional.
In a much-quoted statement, Justice Cameron explains the reasons for taking a
different approach to the sentencing of children:
The Constitution draws this sharp distinction between children and adults not out
of sentimental considerations, but for practical reasons relating to children’s greater
physical and psychological vulnerability. Children’s bodies are generally frailer, and
their ability to make choices generally more constricted, than those of adults. They
are less able to protect themselves, more needful of protection, and less resourceful
in self-maintenance than adults.187
The sentencing chapter of the CJA is divided into two parts.188 The first (general)
part describes the objectives of sentencing, which by and large emphasise a
restorative justice basis for the selection of a sentence.189 Additional principles apply
when consideration is being given to a sentence involving deprivation of liberty, in
line with art 37(b) of the CRC and s 28(1)(g) of the Constitution and existing
jurisprudence.190 The principles applicable to child and youth care centre sentences
are further detailed—the court must first consider whether the offence is of such a
serious nature that it indicates that the child has a tendency towards harmful
activities; the harm caused must indicate that a residential sentence is appropriate,
measured against the culpability of the child for causing that harm; and whether the
child is in need of a particular service offered at a child and youth care centre. In S v
185 2009 (6) SA 632 (CC).
186 S v B 2006 (1) SACR 311 (SCA).
187 Paragraph [26].
188 See, in general, Terblanche ‘The Child Justice Act: a detailed consideration of s 68 as a point of
departure with respect to the sentencing of young offenders’ (2012) 15 Potchefstroom Electronic Law
Journal 436.
189 See ss 69(1(a)–(d) and s 69(2).
190 S v N 2008 (2) SACR 135 (SCA) where Cameron J (as he then was) said (para [39]): ‘[I]f there is a
legitimate option other than prison, we must choose it; but if prison is unavoidable its form and
duration should also be tempered. Every day he spends in prison should be because there is no
alternative’. In S v B 2006 (1) SACR 311 (SCA) Ponnan AJA states that the key principles underpinning
sentencing of children are proportionality and the best interests of the child (para [16]).
Individualisation is important to ensure the child’s reintegration into society (para [14]).
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CKM191 the court was faced with a situation where, after first being diverted and
failing to comply with the conditions of the diversion order, the accused were
prosecuted. They were sentenced to a reformatory school but absconded,
whereafter, they were detained (without charges being brought against them) for an
indefinite period in a child and youth care centre designated for awaiting trial
detainees. The court (finding the detention in the child and youth care centre wholly
unlawful) also had the following to say about the initial sentence:
It is obvious that the referral to a reform school192 [which has now been replaced
by a sentence to a child and youth care facility in the CJA], which amounts to an
involuntary, compulsory admission to a facility where the convicted child is obliged
to participate in various programmes, represents a serious invasion of the child’s
rights to freedom of movement and decision-making. Such a sentence should
therefore not be imposed lightly or without compelling reasons.193
It was pointed out that neither the trial court nor the pre-sentence report had
referred, at any stage, to the principle that the incarceration of children—or
detention in a reform school—should be the least preferred options under all and any
circumstances.194 Concluding that the children concerned were more likely to have
been candidates for the child protection system in view of their poor home
circumstances and lack of supervision, the court could no longer effect this
intervention due to the lapse of time and the fact that they were now nearing 18 years
of age. Bearing in mind the period also spent languishing in a secure-care facility
without a valid order of court, the sentence was therefore set aside and replaced with
a caution and discharge.
As regards the most restrictive form of deprivation of liberty, namely imprison-
ment, the CJA sets additional principles to be considered. These include (amongst
others) the seriousness of the offence, the protection of the community, the severity
of the impact of the offence upon the victim, and the desirability of keeping the child
out of prison.195
Two further general principles are worthy of note. First, that the impact of the
offence upon the victim may be adduced at sentencing stage, where practicable by
means of a victim impact statement. This means that a generous role has been
accorded victims interests in the CJA (see together with the role accorded the views
of victims at the diversion stage, as discussed above), and this attention to the
position of victims breaks new ground in South African criminal justice. Second, the
CJA makes the composition of pre-sentence reports by a probation officer mandatory
(except where it is dispensed with because of undue delay which would prejudice
the child—but then no sentence involving deprivation of liberty may be imposed by
191 2013 (2) SACR 303 (GNP).
192 Under the now repealed s 290 of the CPA.
193 Paragraph [15]. It is worth noting that the sentence was in the past always subject to an automatic
review in chambers by a High Court. Similarly, the modern-day sentence to compulsory residence is
also subject to automatic review by a judge of the High Court in terms of s 85 of the CJA (as amended).
194 Paragraph [18]. Nor had the sentencing officer sent the original sentence on review, as he was obliged
to do (para [19]).
195 Section 69(4) of the CJA. These principles must be read in conjunction with the rules directly
applicable to imprisonment: see s 77 discussed below.
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the court).196 The time period for preparation of the pre-sentence report is no later
than six weeks after it has been requested.197
The court may deviate from the sentence recommended by the probation officer,
but must then note the reasons for imposing a different sentence on the record.198
In Part 2 of the sentencing chapter, the specific sentences are detailed. First,
community-based sentences, involving the harnessing of the options spelt out under
the diversion chapter, are made available as sentencing options. The fulfilment of the
relevant order must be monitored by a probation officer,199 and failure of the child to
comply with conditions set may result in the child being brought back to court for an
inquiry into the reasons for this.200 The 2015/2016 Department of Justice and
Correctional Services Annual Report reveals that community-based sentences remain
in the majority: 753 in 2013/3014, and 543 in 2014/2015. The 2015/2016 figure is
low (2), possibility due to incorrect data capturing.
Next, restorative justice sentences are contemplated, either family group
conferences, victim–offender mediation, or any other restorative process which is in
accordance with the definition of restorative justice. The 2015/2016 Annual Report
of the Department of Justice and Correctional Services indicates that after an initial
upswing in restorative justice sentences (508 in 2012/2013), number have
declined—179 in 2014/2015, and only 1 in 2016 (though this may be due to incorrect
data capturing).
Fines as an option for children—or their exclusion as a competent sentence—were
hotly debated by the SALRC, which ultimately concluded that imposing fines (on
children who cannot themselves pay) penalises parents.201 This position did not hold
sway however, and s 74 now provides for the possibility of a fine or an alternative to
a fine, provided that this be preceded by an inquiry into the ability of a child, his or
her parents or guardian, or an appropriate adult to pay any financial penalty, and
whether non-payment might result in the child being imprisoned.202 In the
alternative, the court may consider imposing symbolic restitution, payment of
compensation to a specified person or organisation (or community group or charity),
or obliging the child to provide some service to the benefit of a specified person or
organisation (or community group or charity), also known as community service.
However, the child must be 15 years of age before such order may be considered.203
Interestingly, the figures given for the use of fines or alternative to fines are not
insignificant—2013/2014 there were 43 fines and 50 alternatives, and in 2014/2015
the figures were 18 and 47 respectively. This tends to support the choice made to
retain the option of monetary penalties or a suitable substitute.
196 Section 71(1)(a) and (b).
197 Section 71(2).
198 See, in general, Terblanche ‘The Child Justice Act: procedural sentencing issues’ (2013) 16
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 321.
199 Section 72(2)(a).
200 The court may then confirm, amend or substitute the original sentence—s 79 of the CJA.
201 SALRC (Project 106) Report on Juvenile Justice (2000) para 10.41.
202 Section 74(1) of the CJA.
203 This accords with the age of compulsory schooling and the minimum age for child work.
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Correctional supervision as contemplated in the CJA can also be regarded as a
non-custodial sentence. This is because, in accordance with amendments effected to
the Act in 2013,204 only correctional supervision under s 276(1)(h) (which is served
wholly outside of correctional centres and which is monitored by personnel
employed by the Department of Correctional Services) may be imposed.205 The data
for 2014/2015 shows that 188 sentences of correctional supervision were imposed
by child justice courts, and for 2014/2015 there were 81. The data before the
amendment may not be comparable.
The two forms of custodial sentences, as already mentioned, are a sentence to
compulsory residence in a child and youth care centre, and imprisonment. Each is
dealt with briefly. The first is a new sentence created by the Child Justice Act (it
replaces the former possibility of sentencing a child to a reform school) and it may be
imposed for a period not exceeding five years or for a period which may not exceed
the date on which the child turns 21 years of age, whichever date is earlier.206 This
can be contrasted with the position under the CPA when a reform school sentence
was, in the first instance, for a maximum period of two years (although it could be
extended until the age of 21 years).207
Data indicates that this form of deprivation of liberty has overtaken imprisonment
considerably since the inception of the CJA: the number of sentences were 353 in
2011/2012; 335 in 2012/2013; 381 in 2013/2014; and 245 in 2014/2015. Now
roughly six times more children are sentenced to this form of deprivation of liberty
than are sentenced to imprisonment.
Muntingh and Ballard208 voice two concerns relating to sentencing to a child and
youth care facility. First, there is no provision in the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 for
early release, such as parole. However, anecdotally is has been communicated that an
early release programme to incentivise good behaviour is being implemented, at least
in the Western Cape.209 Their second complaint is that there is no independent
oversight body to monitor the deprivation of liberty of children in these facilities,
akin to the Judicial Inspectorate of prisons. Although the Children’s Act 38 of 2005
makes provision for an internal process of quality assurance, this is no substitute for
independent oversight mechanisms.
The second form of deprivation of liberty is imprisonment. This sentence is highly
restricted under the CJA, and s 77 of the CJA limits this option to children over the
age of 14 years at the time of sentencing,210 and in the ordinary course, to children
convicted of offences set out in Schedule 3. Such a sentence may only be imposed for
204 Section 38 of Act 42 of 2013, in effect from 22 January 2014.
205 Under the original CJA, correctional supervision imposed under s 276(1)(i), which required a period
of incarceration prior to the community-based portion of the sentence coming into effect, was
permitted for persons aged over 14 years.
206 The sentence contemplated in s 76(3) is discussed below under imprisonment because the child is
first detained in child and youth care centre whereafter the sentence of imprisonment is served in a
prison (after confirmation by a court).
207 Section 291 CPA.
208 Muntingh & Ballard ‘Are the rights of children paramount in prison legislation?’ 2013 SACJ 337 at 347.
209 Personal communication, provincial director of secure-care facilities (May 2016).
210 Note: the age of the child at the time of the commission of the offence is not the criterion here.
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a Schedule 2 offence if substantial and compelling reasons exist for imposing a
sentence of imprisonment,211 and for a Schedule 1 offence ‘if the child has a record of
relevant previous convictions and substantial and compelling reasons exist’ for
imposing a sentence of imprisonment.212 The possibility of a sentence of correctional
supervision for which a portion of the sentence is served in prison before release
under community corrections (the so called s 276(1)(i) of the CPA option) is
provided for in s 77(4)(b) of the CJA; this sentence is clearly regarded as tantamount
to imprisonment.
Although the sentence of life imprisonment is not mentioned in the CJA, the Act is
ultimately ambiguous about this form of imprisonment for children. Given that the
minimum sentencing regime (which culminated in the sentence of life imprisonment
in the hierarchy set) was ruled unconstitutional in Centre for Child Law v Minister of
Justice and Constitutional Development,213 on the basis (inter alia) that a life
sentence as the pre-ordained minimum offended the constitutional principle of
detention for the shortest appropriate period of time, it could be assumed that a life
sentence is no longer a competent sentence for a child aged below 18. This view is
bolstered by the express prohibition on life imprisonment (without parole) as a
competent sentence for offenders whose crimes were committee whilst they were
below the age of 18 years in the CRC’s art 37(b). Moreover, s 77(6) (somewhat coyly)
expressly refers to compliance with international obligations. Yet, the same section
also refers to the possibility of a sentence of life imprisonment (albeit in the context
of ensuring that the possibility of early release from imprisonment is not unduly
curtailed). It is somewhat odd that this subsection was not amended consequent to
the Centre for Child Law finding above (as was sub-s 77(2) which had provided for
the minimum sentencing regime).214 In the event, s 77(4)(a) clearly contemplates
the possibility of lengthy sentences for children, as a maximum of 25 years
imprisonment is permitted: this is also the period after which the possibility of parole
for any person serving life imprisonment must be considered.
The case law on sentencing that has emerged under the CJA is tending to
emphasise that presiding officers must pay meticulous attention to the provisions of
the CJA when contemplating a sentence of imprisonment. In S v CS,215 an appeal was
brought against a ten-year sentence of imprisonment imposed upon a 15-year-old for
a cold-blooded, unprovoked shooting of a passer-by on a motorbike. The appeal court
methodically examined the trial court’s analysis of the factors required to be taken
into account by the CJA. The magistrate had not taken into account the desirability of
keeping the appellant out of prison,216 nor had the court investigated the suitability
of other sentencing options. The court had not taken s 77(5) of the CJA into
account—that the court must take into account the number of days spent
211 Section 77(3)(b) of the CJA.
212 Section 77(3)(c) of the CJA.
213 2009 (2) SACR 477 (CC).
214 By s 4(a) of Act 14 of 2014 (in effect from 19 May 2014).
215 2016 (1) SACR 584 (WCC), discussed by Reyneke in ‘Child justice’ 2016 SACJ 376.
216 Section 69(4)(e) of the CJA.
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incarcerated whilst awaiting trial;217 and had neglected to indicate why a sentence of
ten years imprisonment should be regarded as the shortest appropriate period of
time.
However, the appeal court dismissed the possibility of other sentencing
alternatives to imprisonment; once weighed against the seriousness of the offence
and the past behaviour of the accused, including his lack of remorse, the ten year
sentence was ultimately substituted with a term of eight years imprisonment.
In S v SD,218 the appellant was found guilty of murder of his adoptive parents when
he was 17 years and 8 months old. A sentence of 12 years direct imprisonment was
imposed. However, the Supreme Court of Appeal agreed that a custodial sentence
was unavoidable given the severity of the crime. The court noted, however, that
apart from rehabilitation (the accused was a drug user in need of intensive
treatment), the court had to keep other interests in mind when imposing sentence,
such as prevention. The court did not interfere with the sentence imposed and
dismissed the appeal.
An interesting new possibility is the sentence created by s 76(3), which permits the
imposition of a sentence to a CYCC,219 with the addition of a sentence of
imprisonment to be served thereafter. This sentence may be imposed only for a
Schedule 3 offence, and for an offence which, had the accused been an adult, a
sentence of imprisonment exceeding ten years would have been warranted. It would
seem, on the face of it, to be pointless to sentence a child to a less restrictive form of
custody if that is to be followed by imprisonment, were it not for the fact that
s 76(3)(b) requires that the child justice court which imposed the original sentence,
must, on completion of the initial portion, receive a report from the head of the
CYCC on which the second sentence should be served or whether the aims of
reintegration of the child into society had been fulfilled. In the first known sentence
of this nature, the head of the CYCC (upon expiry of the first part the sentence)
argued that reintegration had in fact been achieved.220
The statistics of incarceration rates of children bear out the point that the CJA has
dramatically reduced the use of imprisonment as a sentence. Whilst in April 2010 (at
the commencement of the Act) there were 717 sentenced children in prisons, this
figure declined to 187 on 31 March 2016, a more than 73 per cent drop. The extent to
which imprisonment has been replaced by a sentence to the other form of custodial
sentence in a CYCC is not easy to establish, as the DSD data does not separate
children in CYCC’s awaiting trial, and those serving a sentence.
Finally, s 78 CJA explains that the CPA governs suspension and postponement of
sentence, and that a probation officer may be appointed to monitor any conditions of
postponement and to provide the court with progress reports on the child’s
compliance with these conditions.
217 In casu, 9 months and 24 days in a child and youth care centre.
218 2015 (2) SACR 363 (SCA), also discussed by Reyneke 2016 SACJ 376.
219 This would be after five years or until the accused turns 21, whichever occurs first: s 76(2).
220 Personal communication, manager of secure-care facilities, Western Cape DSD.
Child Law October 2, 2017
Child Justice 719
JOBNAME: Private Law Pertaini PAGE: 44 SESS: 6 OUTPUT: Mon Oct 2 15:38:03 2017 SUM: 5A3BF8D9
/first/juta−gj/juta/Priv−child−law−2017/23−ch23New
23.11 LEGAL REPRESENTATION
The CJA’s fairly unique provisions pertaining to legal representation were strongly
influenced by the specific history of legal representation of indigent children in the
period before the reform of the Judicare (the model of legal aid in which the mandate
to represent indigent clients was largely outsourced to private law firms which had
prevailed in South Africa) to the model where legal services are primarily sourced
from practitioners hired by Legal Aid South Africa to operate from Justice Centres.
Under the previous system, the SALRC had identified a number of challenges to
children’s enjoyment of legal representation at state expense. These included that
children did not trust lawyers, whom they thought were in cahoots with the state;
they thought that they could mount a better defence themselves; they expressed the
view that their lawyers did not listen to them and rode roughshod over their wishes;
and they were of the erroneous view that agreeing to legal representation was an
indication of guilt.221
The premise of the drafters of the CJA was, first, that most children would qualify
for state-funded legal representation on the basis of their lack of means. Secondly, it
was understood that merely facing criminal charges in a child justice court would
raise the prospect of substantial injustice ensuing if the child was not legally
represented at his or her trial.222 Thirdly, the SALRC envisaged a client-directed
model of defence of children and sought to ensure that the child client would be
empowered to provide independent instructions. Although the SALRC had proposed
the idea of specialist (trained) lawyers to serve as legal representatives for children,
this was ultimately not accepted, nor was it necessary given that Legal Aid South
Africa established Children’s Units in the lead-up to the adoption of the CJA, which
provided a platform for specialisation amongst its staff and for dedicated training.223
Hence, s 80 of the CJA provides for the duties of a legal representative towards the
child client: to allow the child to give independent instructions concerning the
matter, to explain the rights and duties of the child in a manner appropriate to the
age and intellectual development of the child, to promote diversion where
appropriate, to ensure the conclusion of processes under the CJA without delay and
to uphold the best interests of the child, and to uphold the highest standards of
ethical behaviour and professional conduct (on pain of reporting to the relevant
professional body or the imposition of other appropriate remedial sanction).
Section 82, which deals with the circumstances under which a child must be
legally represented, allows for a representative of his or her own choice. Further, it
subjects the decision to grant legal representation at state expense to the criteria
specified in the Legal Aid South Africa Act 39 of 2014. Where the provisions diverge
with the past, though, is in relation to a situation where a child refuses (waives) his or
her right to legal representation. The capacity to do this is expressly removed by s 83,
which states that where a child does not wish to have a legal representative, or
221 SALRC Discussion Paper 79 (Project 106) Juvenile Justice (1998) at 266–277.
222 Section 35(2)(c) of the Constitution requires the provision of legal representation at state expense if
substantial injustice would otherwise result.
223 For a discussion of the changing landscape at the time, see SALRC (Project 106) Report on Juvenile
Justice (2000) at 11.8 and 11.9.
Child Law October 2, 2017
720 Justice for Children as Victims and as Offenders
JOBNAME: Private Law Pertaini PAGE: 45 SESS: 6 OUTPUT: Mon Oct 2 15:38:03 2017 SUM: 557C49EE
/first/juta−gj/juta/Priv−child−law−2017/23−ch23New
declines to give instructions to an appointed lawyer, the court must note this on the
record. Thereafter, a legal representative must be appointed by Legal Aid South Africa
to assist the court. The regulations224 to the CJA spell out the role that this legal
representative should play. The representative is directed to attend all court
proceedings; to address the court on any matter requested by the court; to have
access to documents and statements in the docket (to the extent possible); to address
the court on the merits and procedural aspects of the case and on sentence; to
cross-examine and discredit witnesses, as well as object to questions posed to the
child or to state witnesses; to question the admissibility of evidence; and to present
evidence that will be in the best interests of the child.
To all intents and purposes, the ‘court-assisting’ legal representative fulfils exactly
the same function as a client-instructed one. Indeed, as pointed out by Henney J in S
v LM:225
The practical effect of ch 11 is that a child who appears before a Child Justice Court is
effectively never without some form of legal representation. Even if the child waives the
right to legal representation, a legal representative will be appointed, whose role would
be to proactively assist the court in the manner as set out in reg 48 in order to ensure that
a child accused has a fair trial.226
Karels227 is critical of the CJA provisions concerning legal representation on several
grounds. First, she questions the manner in which the provisions disallow
autonomous instruction by the (child) client because of a lack of cognitive/conative
capacity to give such instructions, yet they proceed to permit a trial.228 Secondly, she
regards the obligation upon a legal representative to promote diversion as being at
odds with the fact that legal representation is not mandatory at the pre-trial stage.
Thirdly, she regards the requirement that counsel conduct proceedings without delay
and in the child’s best interests as idiosyncratic, on the same basis that legal
representation is not mandatory at the pre-trial stage, although she acknowledges that
Legal Aid South Africa recognises that appearance at a preliminary inquiry is part of
the trial process and that state-funded legal representation is warranted at that
proceeding. Fourthly, she is critical of the degree to which the CJA permits the court
to interfere with the actions of legal counsel under the Act, to the extent of making
an order against a legal representative who perpetrates misconduct or displays
incompetence (but not against a prosecutor). Finally, she regards the ‘non-waiver’
provision and concomitant appointment of a legal representative to assist the court as
an undue interference in the self-determination and autonomy rights of the child
accused.
The 2015–2016 Report of Legal Aid South Africa on the implementation of the
Child Justice Act229 indicates that the institution provided legal representation to 11
978 children’s criminal matters in that period, and that coverage of district courts was
224 Regulation 48.
225 2013 (1) SACR 188 (WCC).
226 Paragraph [17].
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at 88 per cent (with coverage of regional courts being 97 per cent). Children were
represented by them at preliminary inquiries in 3 441 matters. Extensive training has
been provided on the CJA to Legal Aid South Africa staff, with 1 026 of their
practitioners having received training in 2015–2016. The fulfilment of the child’s
right to legal representation in the modern-day South African criminal justice system
can be regarded as a significant achievement, in compliance with art 40(2)(b)(ii) of
the CRC and art 17(2)(iii) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the
Child.
23.12 MISCELLANEOUS
23.12.1 Machinery for monitoring implementation
The requirement of a national body to monitor the implementation of the CJA was
born out of the experience during the late 1990s of trying to reduce the number of
children remanded to await trial in prisons. From the early years of the millennium, a
national committee comprising all the relevant government departments, and with
some NGO representation, began to meet. This informal structure has been given
statutory recognition in ss 94– 96 of the CJA, which establishes the Intersectoral
Committee for Child Justice, comprising the Director-General of Justice, the National
Director of Public Prosecutions, the National Commissioner of the South African
Police Services, the National Commissioner of Correctional Services, the Director-
General of Social Development, the Director-General of Education and the
Director-General of Health, all of whom may designate officials to represent them.
Representatives from non-governmental organisations and civil society may be
invited to meetings, which must be held at least twice annually.230 The
responsibilities and functions of the Intersectoral Committee are detailed in s 96 of
the CJA and include developing implementation priorities, measuring progress on the
achievement of the objectives of the national policy framework and of the CJA,
maintaining an integrated information-management system to enable monitoring and
the analysis of trends and interventions, as well as to map the flow of children though
the child justice system, and to prepare and submit annual reports to Parliament on
the implementation of the Act. Whilst initially the CJA provided for a joint report
from the duty-bearers, this proved difficult to achieve in practice and an amendment
was made in 2015 which will henceforth see the submission of separate reports from
each department.
The reports referred to throughout this chapter constitute the official reports
tabled thus far, and they provide at least a snapshot overview of the developing
implementation of the CJA.231
23.12.2 Relationship to the Children’s Act 38 of 2005
There remain several points at which the child justice system and the Children’s Act
38 of 2005 (hereinafter ‘Children’s Act’) intersect. The first is via the provisions of the
230 Section 95(a) of the CJA.
231 See http://www.justice.gov.za/vg/childjustice.html for relevant documentation.
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CJA which enable the transfer of a criminal matter to the (quasi-civil) children’s court
for an inquiry into the care and protection needs of the child. This is provided for
most directly in s 50, which allocates the responsibility for effecting this to the
inquiry magistrate at the preliminary inquiry.232 The child must appear to the inquiry
magistrate to fulfil one of the criteria in s 150(1) or 150(2) of the Children’s Act. In
addition, s 50 draws attention to the possibility of a children’s court referral where
the child does not live at home or in appropriate alternative care, as well as where the
child is alleged to have committed a minor offence or offences aimed at meeting the
child’s basic need for food or warmth.233 The effect of a referral under s 50 is that the
criminal proceedings are stopped altogether, and this has the likely effect of
removing the prosecutorial discretion to insist upon a prosecution continuing. As
noted earlier, it appears that this option was used in 89 cases referred from the
preliminary inquiry in the year 2015–2016, and no instances were provided of
referrals from a child justice court to the children’s court in that reporting period.
A second point at which the Children’s Act and the Child Justice Act articulate is
via the provisions relating to secure care, since secure-care facilities are now
classified as child and youth care centres (CYCCs). These are governed by chap 14 of
the Children’s Act.234 ‘Secure care’ means the physical containment in a safe and
healthy environment of children with behavioural and emotional difficulties and of
children in conflict with the law. Since different CYCCs accommodate children who
need alternative care for different reasons (orphans, abandoned children, unaccom-
panied migrant children) a facility which received children in conflict with the law
under referral from the CJA must be registered for the delivery of a secure-care
programme in accordance with s 191(2)(h)235 or s 191(2)(j)(i)236 of the Children’s
Act.
There are, as at the time of writing, 19 secure-care facilities, spread amongst the
provinces. The total available accommodation is 2 456 beds. Not all facilities receive
both sentenced and awaiting-trial children, and some receive either only awaiting-
trial children or only sentenced children. One facility is designated to receive girls
only.237
There has been some litigation involving secure-care facilities, notably in the
Eastern Cape and the Western Cape. In S v Goliath238 a magistrate had paid an
232 However, the probation officer effecting assessment is directed to include a recommendation on
whether referral to the children’s court is indicated (s 40(1)(a); see too s 35(a), which includes this as
one of the purposes of assessment). A referral to the children’s court is also an option listed under s 9
of the CJA in relation to children aged below the minimum age of criminal capacity.
233 This was intended to strengthen the possibility of referral of children in need of welfare interventions
to the children’s court. Previous studies had found that this option (as provided for by s 254 of the
CPA) was rarely used.
234 Dealing with the establishment and registration of CYCCs in Part 1 of the chapter, and the operation
and management of CYCCs in Part 2 of the chapter.
235 Referring to the reception of children awaiting trial or sentence.
236 Referring to children received in terms of an order under chap 10 of the CJA (as a sentence). See
further under para 23.11 above.
237 See DSD ‘Department of Social Development list of centres’ available at http://www.justice.gov.za/vg/
cj/SC-facilities-list.pdf.
238 2014 (2) SACR 290 (ECG).
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impromptu visit to a secure-care facility upon reading certain newspaper reports. He
discovered that children were roaming around freely, listening to music and not
doing any schoolwork. His investigations revealed that the security guards were so
afraid of the children that they would lock themselves into a room at night. He
discovered further that many of the children absconded nightly from the facility and
that the use of drugs was rampant. The buildings were being vandalised and he found
broken windows, broken doors, damaged light fittings, vandalised swimming pool
pumps, damaged and destroyed furniture and television sets, and broken security
cameras. The main computer centre had been destroyed and attempts had been
made to set the building alight. In short, the facility was wholly dysfunctional. The
judge described the founding affidavit as reluctantly bringing to mind scenes from
William Golding’s Lord of the Flies. The facility was temporary closed and the
children were transferred elsewhere, including to prisons.
The closure of four schools of industry in the Western Cape, and the transfer of
children to other facilities in the province, including secure-care facilities, was the
subject matter of a challenge by the Justice Alliance of South Africa.239 In MEC for
Social Development, Western Cape and Others v Justice Alliance of South Africa
and Another,240 the Supreme Court of Appeal struck down the judgment of the
Western Cape High Court, which had favoured retention of the status quo and had
ordered the MEC not to close the facilities. The Supreme Court of Appeal was of the
view that the centres were in the process of disestablishment from a period
preceding the coming into operation of the Children’s Act by nine years, and that
they were repurposed as schools for children with special needs. The difficulty facing
the initial applicants was that, as at 1 April 2010, the centres did not fall within the
ambit of s 196(1)(d) or (e) of the Children’s Act (the deeming provisions which
envisaged that schools of industry and reformatory schools at that date would be
regarded as CYCCs). The respondent schools were accordingly not, as at 1 April
2010, maintained as schools of industry or reform schools respectively, but had been
legally constituted as schools for leaners with special needs.
The original complaint was also premised on children in need of care and
protection and those with behavioural problems being kept together with children
awaiting trial and sentence. The Supreme Court of Appeal retorted that there is no
provision in the Children’s Act which requires that children in the different
categories should be housed separately in the sense that they need to be placed in
separate facilities.
All that the Children’s Act contemplates is that children in secure care be kept
separate from children not in secure care. In any event, it appears that in the Western
Cape there is a more fundamental separation than that required in terms of the
Children’s Act, in that the different categories of children in secure care are housed
separately in the facilities in which secure care is provided, while children not in
secure care are placed in separate facilities.241
239 Justice Alliance of South Africa and Another v Minister of Social Development, Western Cape and
Others [2015] 4 All SA 467 (WCC).
240 [2016] ZASCA 88 (1 June 2016) .
241 Paragraph [38].
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In any event, the Supreme Court of Appeal was of the firm view that the placement
of children in different facilities in terms of the Children’s Act was a function of the
provincial director of Social Development, and that the courts could not interfere in
the exercise of this executive function.
23.12.3 Remaining gaps and challenges
The central issue that has emerged since the coming into operation of the CJA in
2010 is the dramatic drop in the number of children being processed through the
system. The causes for this drop are speculative, but seem to emanate from the fact
that fewer children are being arrested. The declining numbers permeate all aspects of
the child justice system: there are fewer children in diversion programmes, fewer
assessments and preliminary inquiries, and fewer children’s trials being held.
At the same time, the diminishing number of children incarcerated in prisons (as
awaiting-trial remandees or as sentenced prisoners) is commendable. Whilst the
development of the alternative of secure-care facilities is partially accountable for the
drop in numbers since the turn of the millennium, there can be no doubt, too, that
enhanced vigilance by the various stakeholders in the child justice system as to
implementing the constitutional and international law principle of deprivation of
liberty of children as a last resort, and for the shortest appropriate period of time,
must be credited too.
The time is now overdue for an in-depth qualitative study into the functioning of
the child justice system, and it is to be hoped that this will ensue in the not-too-distant
future.
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